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I. INTRODUCTION
Martin Buber's observation that "every word must falsify
", could mistakenly be dismissed as an unilluminating paradox,
another example of the truism that all language is inherently inaccu-
rate.2 He leaves unanswered the more difficult problem of deter-
mining the degree of ambiguity of different words.3 But Buber is
reminding us that the limitations of language include deception as
well as uncertainty; linguistic facility simultaneously impedes and
enhances perception. The danger is more than perceptual; using
words as a guide, many governments have executed many citizens.
1. M. BUBER, I AND THOU 67 (W. Kaufman trans. 1970). Translations create another layer
of distortion. How false a translation was the English word "falsify"?
2. By the early nineteenth century, philosophers such as Hamman were considering many of
the problems created by language's flaws: "Language is not only the foundation for the whole
faculty of thinking, but the central point also from which proceed the misunderstandings of reason
by herself." Quotedin A. KOESTLER, THE AcT OF CREATION 173 (1964). Platonic glorification of
language, of the ideal image or word over the real, has been attacked; no longer is the word "cat,"
the ideal "cat," necessarily preferable to a real feline. See B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY 119-32 (1945). Obsession with words has been diagnosed as a symptom of schizo-
phrenia, see J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 65 (1949).
3. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527
(1947), and Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67,
90 (1960). The malleability of language has been a long-acknowledged source of income and
entertainment for the legal profession. The drafters of the Constitution were aware of the ambigu-
ity of two Constitutional clauses which will play a primary role in this article: "treason" and
"cruel and unusual punishments."
[Vol. 45:99
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The phrase "death by electrocution" may be a collection of decep-
tive symbols, yet those symbols set the stage for an actual killing.
This article focuses on two words: executing traitors. We have
a good idea of what the first word means, even if we repress the
sordid details of the actual dying.4 Treason, however, is a word no-
table both for its ambiguity and for the powerful emotions it evokes,
emotions found in such equally potent words as betrayal, war and
defeat. As will be seen, by limiting the crime to two types of actions
and by requiring unique procedural protections, the drafters of the
Constitution balanced the country's need for protection from trea-
son against their fear that a future administration might instigate
improper prosecutions. The primary goal of this article is to demon-
strate why the Constitution should be interpreted to require an addi-
tional protection: prohibition of the use of capital punishment in
treason cases unless the government can also prove aggravated
murder.
The Constitution does not provide clear direction concerning
how a person convicted of treason and sentenced to die should chal-
lenge the death sentence. Aside from utilizing such pliable phrases
as "due process" and "privileges and immunities," the defendant's
attack could adopt broader theoretical techniques such as the "un-
written constitution," 5 "emanations and penumbras," 6 or the overall
structure of government implied by the Constitution. Precedent
reduces the possibilities; the grants of "privileges and immunities,"
contained in Article IV, section 2, and in the fourteenth amendment,
might have been the sources of many individual rights, but the
4. Warden Lewis, who witnessed several electrocutions while at Sing Sing, described such a
death:
As the switch is thrown into its sockets there is a sputtering - and the body leaps as if
to break the strong leather straps that hold it. Sometimes a thin gray wisp of smoke
pushes itself out from under the helmet that holds the head electrode, followed by the
faint odor of burning flesh. The hands turn red, then white, and the cords of the neck
stand out. . . . The initial voltage of 2,000 to 2,200 and the amperage of 7 to 12 are
lowered and reapplied at various intervals.
L. LAWES, LIFE AND DEATH IN SING SING 170 (1928).
5. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975). Grey
argues that the Supreme Court can properly exercise its constitutional power of judicial review to
enforce principles of liberty that are not expressly protected by the written Constitution. In a
subsequent article he claims that such an expansive reading of the Constitution is consistent with
the views of those who lived during the framing of the written Constitution. See also Grey, Ori-
gins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978).
6. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Slaughter House Cases7 held that the fourteenth amendment's
clause only reaffirmed other rights either guaranteed by the Consti-
tution or clearly implied in the relationship between the citizen and
the government. Although it is never clear what is "clearly im-
plied," the clause has remained moribund for the last hundred
years. The fifth and fourteenth amendments' prohibitions against
the taking of life without due process of law could be other candi-
dates, but in McGautha v. Calfornia8 the Supreme Court held that
due process did not outlaw the death penalty.
The eighth amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punish-
ments has been the focal point of constitutional litigation contesting
the use of capital punishment. Perhaps as a result of the conclusory
nature of the adjectives "cruel and unusual," the Supreme Court has
considered virtually any argument. In 1972, a plurality of the Court
in Furman v. Georgia9 struck down existing death penalty statutes
because the judge or the jury was allowed total discretion when de-
ciding if a defendant should die; such discretion caused a "wanton
and freakish" application of the death penalty. Four years later,
Gregg v. Georgia 10 answered the initial question of the constitution-
ality of the death penalty under any circumstances by holding that
states could execute someone convicted of murder, "the most hei-
nous of crimes."" In Coker v. Georgia,12 however, seven members
of the Court concluded that the eighth amendment proscribed the
electrocution of a convicted rapist who had not killed anyone while
committing his rape (even though he had committed the rape after
escaping from prison while serving various sentences for murder,
rape, kidnapping and aggravated assault). Justices Brennan and
Marshall reaffirmed their position, established in Furman, that the
death penalty was unconstitutional under any circumstances; Justice
7. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
8. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). Challenges could also be based upon the ninth amendment or per-
haps the first amendment. Adverse precedent or history could be distinguished because of
changed circumstances. Chief Justice Hughes upheld a Minnesota statute in Home Building and
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), altering the mortgage foreclosure process, even
though he agreed with the dissent that the framers had originally proscribed the impairment of
contracts to protect creditors in similar circumstances. For a discussion of the Blaisdell decision
and dissent, see generally, C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 39-51
(1969).
9. 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972).
10. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
11. Id at 187.
12. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
[Vol. 45:99
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Powell believed that the facts did not warrant an execution; Justice
White, writing the plurality for himself and Justices Stewart, Black-
mun and Stevens, held that the death penalty for rape was so
"grossly disproportionate" as to be unconstitutional. 13 Enmund v.
Floridal extended Coker by forbidding the execution of a robber
who neither intended nor participated in two killings that occurred
in the course of the robbery.
These cases create a simple syllogism which is this article's pri-
mary legal argument. 15 Gregg allowed the death penalty, partially
because murder was considered the worst crime. Coker concluded
that although rape was the second most serious crime against a per-
son, the death penalty was constitutionally disproportionate: no life
had been taken. Enmund limited the application of the death pen-
alty to those who were as culpable as those murderers who deserved
to die. In addition, Godfrey v. Georgia'6 held that proof of two
murders, without any grisly supporting facts, did not, in itself, qual-
ify as the "aggravating circumstance" needed to justify execution;
the prosecution also had to prove that the killings manifested partic-
ularly depraved behavior. Otherwise, all murders could be charac-
terized as "aggravated," and the Court's prior attempts to force the
states and Congress to distinguish between aggravated murders and
other murders would be defeated. Thus, so long as the government
cannot prove that an aggravated murder resulted from the treason-
ous act or acts, a convicted traitor should not die since no life has
been taken and the traitor is not as culpable as those convicted of
aggravated murder.
13. Id at 592.
14. 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
15. This argument was anticipated by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Coker: "The
clear implication of today's holding appears to be that the death penalty may be properly imposed
only as to crimes resulting in death of the victim. This casts serious doubt upon the constitutional
validity of statutes imposing the death penalty for a variety of conduct which, though dangerous,
may not necessarily result in any immediate death, e.g., treason, airplane hijacking, and kidnap-
ping.!' 433 U.S. at 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
16. 446 U.S. 420 (1982). In Roberts v. Louisana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), and Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), the Court held that the states could not pass statutes making
the death penalty mandatory for certain crimes; there had to be individualized consideration of
statutorily defined aggravating circumstances. The Godfrey court held that a man who instantly
killed two relatives with a shotgun during a family dispute did not meet the Georgia statutory
definition, which permitted death if the offense "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."
GA. CODE § 27-2534, l(b)(7) (1978). Since there was no principled way to distinguish this murder
from any other, the defendant should not die, 446 U.S. at 425. Accordingly, the crime of treason
must be analogized to aggravated murder, not just to murder.
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The Court is under no logical obligation to accept the syllo-
gism. All the recent death penalty cases can be distinguished on the
basis that they review capital punishment for physical crimes
against specific persons, while treason injures the "state/society."
The harm caused by treason-possible destruction of the existing
government and society-may far exceed any injury caused by most
murders.
The rest of this article will explore several interrelated tech-
niques that the Court can use to reject or accept the syllogism; there
is no predetermined way for a Justice to determine the constitu-
tional meaning of such "false" words as "treason" and "cruel and
unusual punishments." First, a brief description of the evolution of
treason law and of the concept of cruel and unusual punishment will
be presented to show how the clauses have been defined and applied
by legislatures, prosecutors and judges, before and after the drafting
of the Constitution. Second, philosophical theories of punishment
will be examined to better understand why, when and how society
should punish criminals for different crimes. Then, the eighth
amendment case law will be considered to determine if the reason-
ing in Coker and Enmund should be controlling, thereby virtually
overruling the decision to execute the Rosenbergs for espionage. Fi-
nally, the article will evaluate a hypothetical statute that might re-
duce the likelihood of unjust treason executions. The proposed
statute highlights deficiencies in the existing law as well as the diffi-
culties of improvement.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE TREASON CLAUSE
Treason is the only crime considered in the Constitution:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid
and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Trea-
son, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Forfeiture except during the life of the Person attainted.17
This unique treatment reflected the framers' theory of government,
based upon their personal experience, historical perspective and
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
[Vol. 45:99
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philosophical theory. Only historical analysis can explain the origi-
nal meaning of the words chosen.
A. Treason in England Prior to the Revolution
English statutes and cases provided the framework from which
American treason law developed. In 1351, an English statute con-
demned as treason seven types of behavior. The three most impor-
tant categories were: (1) levying war against the king; (2) adhering
to the king's enemies, giving them aid and comfort; and (3) compas-
sing or imagining the death of the king.'8 English courts construed
"levying war" to include riots, and "compassing" to include spoken
or written words criticizing the king. These "constructive treasons"
were brutally applied. 19 In 1710, Dr. Henry Sacheverell preached
and published two sermons supporting passive obedience and
nonresistance to the king. When the Whig ministry attempted im-
peachment, many of Sacheverell's sympathizers rioted in the streets
of London and tore down several opposition meeting houses be-
cause they believed their Church was being attacked. The leaders of
the riot were charged with levying war against the king.2°
Treason was considered the worst crime in England, as evinced
by carefully designed statutes protecting the king. For example, a
cleric could never claim that he had a right to be tried in the ecclesi-
astical courts for high treason; he had to face judgment in the king's
secular courts.21 The punishment for treason was grossly unique:
18. The Treason Act, 1352, 25 Edw. III, st. 5, c.2 (1350). The other four acts considered
treasonous were: (4) violation of the king's wife, eldest unmarried daughter, or wife of the heir
apparent; (5) counterfeiting; (6) knowingly bringing counterfeit into the country, with fraudulent
intent; and (7) slaying the Chancellor, Treasurer, or one of the king's justices.
19. According to Lord Campbell, a tragic application of this statute occurred when William
Walker was hanged, drawn, and quartered for telling his son, "Tom, if thou behavest thyself well,
I will make thee heir to the Crown." Mr. Walker was jokingly referring to his inn, known as the
"Crown." The Court ruled that the language compassed the death of the king and that intent was
irrelevant. See 1 J. CAMPBELL, LIvEs OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 147-49 (1849 ed.).
This account has been disputed. See E. Foss, JUDGES OF ENGLAND 414-16 (1851). See also
Finer, Hens Rea, the First Amendment and Threats Against the Life of the President, 18 ARIZ. L.
REv. 863 (1976), for a discussion of the difficulties in applying the old English treason of"compas-
sing" to the modem crime of threatening the life of the president.
20. B. CHAPIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON 4-5 (1964). Another chilling example was
the conviction of Algernon Sidney for writing an unpublished manuscript on government; the
document was found in his study. Rex v. Sidney, Howell's State Trials, 9:818 (1683). William
Twyn was literally carved up for writing a book supporting the right to revolt. Rex v. Twyn,
Howell's State Trials, 6:513, 536 (1663).
21. C. REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 74-75 (1980).
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1. That the offender be drawn to the gallows, and not be carried or
walk; though usually (by connivance at length ripened by humanity
into law) a sledge or hurdle is allowed.. . . 2. That he be hanged by
the neck and then cut down alive. 3. That his entrails be taken out and
burned, while he is yet alive. 4. That his head be cut off. 5. That his
body be divided into four parts. 6. That his head and quarters be at the
King's disposal.
22
The Crown's power to confiscate all of the traitor's property added
more injury to this savagery. Confiscation was particularly profita-
ble during the Bloody Assizes, which were aptly named; over two
hundred followers of Lord Monmouth, who led a revolt in 1685,
were executed after they pled guilty upon assurances they would not
be killed.23
Because there were relatively few treason trials in England and
because the trial records that existed were scanty, Professor Hurst
emphasized the work of English commentators in his leading study
of treason. Hurst concluded that the commentators wanted to limit
the scope of treason by requiring proof of an overt act to substanti-
ate treasonable intent, thereby protecting thoughts and words.24 All
of the early commentators agreed (as did Hurst) that the crime of
treason was needed to defend the state.25
Procedural protections for the defendant were introduced often
in treason cases. The Treason Trials Act of 1696, a result of the
1688 Revolution, provided: (1) that a person could only be con-
victed of treason if two witnesses testified to the same overt act; (2)
that the defendant could have a copy of the indictment and a list of
the jury panel prior to trial; and (3) that the defendant could use the
court's power to compel witnesses to attend the hearing.26 This stat-
ute came too late for Sir William Parkins, who was brought to trial
one day before it was to go into effect. He asked for counsel,
granted in the new statute's preamble, but was told that the old law
22. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 92 (Tucker's ed. 1803).
23. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted. The Original Meaning, 57 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 839, 853-54 (1969).
24. Coke apparently wanted evidence of the overt act to prove that the plot had moved from
thought to action, not to show intent: "So as it was not a bare compassing or plotting of the death
of a man, either by word, or writing, but such an overt deed as is aforesaid, to manifest the same
so as if a man had compassed the death of another, and had uttered the same by words or writing,
yet he should not have died for it, for there wanted an overt deed tending to the execution of his
compassing." 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1671). See J. HURST, THE
LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES: COLLECTED ESSAYS 56 (1971).
25. J. HURST, supra note 24, at 56.
26. The Treason Trials Act, 1696, 7 & 8 Wm., c.3 (1696).
[Vol. 45:99
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still applied and that he could not postpone his trial. Parkins was
convicted and executed.
27
B. The Colonial Experience With Treason
The early colonial governments did not initially utilize Eng-
land's treason laws; their definitions were idiosyncratic, frequently
containing Biblical citations:
If any person shall conspire, and attempt any invasion, insurrection, or
publick Rebellion against this Jurisdiction, or shall endeavour to
suprize, or seize any Plantation, or Town, any Fortification, Platform,
or any great Guns, provided for the defence of the Jurisdiction, or any
Plantation therein; or shall treacherously and perfidiously attempt the
altheration and subversion of the frame of policy, or fundamentall
Governmental laid, and settled for this Jurisdiction, he or they shall be
put to death. Nun 16. 2 Sam. 18. 2 Sam. 20.28
These unique statutes were gradually replaced by language echoing
England's statutes. Because of the unavailability of case law, the
colonists primarily relied upon the English statutes and commenta-
ries.29 Yet there were continual attempts to broaden the definition
of treason. In response to a local uprising, New York passed a law
in 1691 which declared that any act committed "by force of arms or
otherwise to disturb the peace good and quiet of this their Majestyes
Government" was treason. 30 This statute was later repealed because
"said Clause hath been of late misinterpreted to the oppression of
her Subjects .... ,,3, New York's legislators apparently assumed
that the clause was capable of interpretation in the first place.
Before the American Revolution, the colonies used the English
concept of "constructive treason." In his charge to the Grand Jury
in 1765 and 1766, the Chief Justice of Massachusetts Bay defined
High Treason as "[1]evying War against the King is High Treason;
as where Peiople set about redressing public Wrongs: this, Gentle-
men, the Law calls levying War against the King; because it is going
in direct Opposition to the King's Authority, who is the Redresser of
27. C. REMBAR, supra note 21, at 383-84.
28. LAWS OF NEW HAVEN COLONY 24 (1656) (Hartford ed. 1858).
29. J. HURST, supra note 24, at 71.
30. 1 COLONIAL LAWS (1664-1775) 223, 575 (1894).
31. 1 LABAREE, ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS (1670-1776) 157
(1935). The British also recommended that the colonists look to England's treason law for
guidance.
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all Wrongs." 32 According to Professor Hurst, such interpretations of
the law of treason did not anger the revolutionaries, and were not a
major factor either in causing the Revolution or in effecting the later
Constitutional efforts to limit the meaning of the crime.33
C. Treason During the Revolution and Prior to the Constitution
When the American Revolution began, the new states did not
immediately pass treason statutes, perhaps out of reluctance to make
such a final step toward complete sovereignty.34 Pressure for
tougher laws and sanctions against political criminals came from the
military, particularly from General Washington. On June 24, 1775,
the Continental Congress passed the Articles of War, which out-
lawed sedition and several war crimes. Washington immediately
used these laws to hang Thomas Hickey, a member of Washington's
personal guard, for counterfeiting and recruiting for the British.35
No comparable power existed to punish civilians; Washington
was initially unable to punish several civilians, including New York
Mayor David Mathews, who worked with Hickey. The General
forced the issue when he accused Mathews of treason and appre-
hended hin. 36 On June 24, 1776 (not coincidentally just before the
drafting of the Declaration of Independence), Congress recom-
mended that each colony pass its own treason law. Drafted by
Thomas Jefferson, the recommendation of June 24 provided the ba-
sic outline for all subsequent state statutes:
That all persons, members of, or owing allegiance to any of the United
Colonies, as before described, who shall levy war against any of the
32. QUINCY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 176, 221
(1865) quoted in, J. HURST, supra note 24, at 78.
33. J. HURST, supra note 24, at 82. The colonists knew their revolution was treason. Never-
theless, they were infuriated by a Parliamentary statute, passed in 1774, authorizing the Parlia-
ment to try any colonist accused of treason in England instead of in the colonies. This venue
statute was probably the main source of the complaint in the Declaration of Independence: "For
transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended offenses." Id at 86.
34. B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 38.
35. Id at 35-37. Hickey was found guilty of "sedition and mutiny, and also of holding
treacherous correspondence with the enemy." 5 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, FROM
THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT PROTECTED BY THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION. IN A SOURCES 1745-
1799 at 182 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1931-44). Benjamin Church, chief surgeon for the Continental
Army, also committed treason. See B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 30-32.
36. Washington claimed that Mathews worked with Hickey. Mathews was not charged with
treason by New York, but he was sent to Connecticut. Id at 36. See also Nettels, 4 Link in the
Chain of Events Leading to American Independence, III WM. & MARY Q., Sec. 3, 36 (1946).
[Vol. 45:99
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said colonies within the same, or be adherent to the King of Great Brit-
ain, or others the enemies of the said colonies, or any of them, within
the same, giving to him or them aid and comfort, are guilty of treason
against such colony.
37
Jefferson's definition of treason duplicated the language of the Eng-
lish statute, except for an omission of the crime of compassing the
death of the king, which was probably excluded for the simple rea-
son that there was no king.38
The Continental Congress's proposal was not strictly complied
with. The states preferred to define treason more broadly. A typical
example is the following statute passed by New York on March 30,
1781, five years after the initial authorization.
WHEREAS, altho' adhering to the Enemies of this State is by Law,
High Treason against the People of this State; yet in Order more effec-
tually to prevent an Adherence to the King of Great Britain it is
deemed requisite that farther Provision should be made by law.
Be it therefore enacted ... That if any Person being a Citizen or
Subject of this State, or of any of the United States of America and
abiding or residing within this State, shall maliciously advisedly and
directly by preaching, teaching, speaking, writing or printing declare or
maintain that the King of Great Britain hath or of right ought to have,
any authority or Dominion in or over this State or the inhibitants
thereof, or shall maliciously and advisedly seduce or persuade or at-
tempt to seduce or persuade any inhabitant of this State to renounce his
or her allegiance to this State or to acknowledge allegiance or subjec-
tion to the King or Crown of Great Britain . . . and be convicted
thereof shall be adjudged guilty of Felony and shall suffer the Pains
and Penalties prescribed by Law in Cases of Felony without Benefit of
Clergy. . . .39
In the same year, New Hampshire declared that persons committed
High Treason if they wrote that the king had authority in the state.
4°
New Hampshire's 1784 Constitution limited the death penalty to
37. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 475 (1906); 6 FORCE, AMERICAN
ARCHIVES, 4th ser. 1720 (1846).
38. J. HURST, supra note 24, at 87.
39. Laws of the State of N.Y., 1781 (4th Sess.), c. XLVII, 189.
40. 4 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 384 (Batchellor ed. 1904). Jefferson drafted a Virginia stat-
ute providing for a fine not to exceed 20,000 pounds and imprisonment not exceeding five years
if any person residing or being within this commonwealth shall... by any work, open
deed, or act, advisedly and willingly maintain and defend the authority, jurisdiction, or
power, of the king or parliament of Great Britain, heretofore claimed and exercised
within this colony, or shall attribute any such authority, jurisdiction, or power, to the
king or parliament of Great Britain.
Virginia, Oct., 1776, c. V, 9 HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE (1823). See generally L. LEvY, JEFFER-
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murder and treason.41
Nor were the revolutionaries reluctant to use these vague laws
to destroy support for Great Britain.42 The treason trials in Penn-
sylvania were classic examples of selective use of indictments and
punishments against political criminals. After the revolutionaries
captured Philadelphia, five hundred people were charged with trea-
son under a statute that defined the offense not only as levying war
or adhering to the enemy, but also as failing to take an oath of alle-
giance to the State of Pennsylvania.43 The supreme executive coun-
cil then declared that anyone who refused to stand trial on such
charges was a traitor.44 Most of the charges were brought against
city-dwelling Quakers, who were members of the old political and
social order. Attacking the wealthy Quaker leadership was advanta-
geous not only because it was, in the words of General John Arm-
strong, "to make examples of the more atrotious (sic),"4 5 but also
because the prosecutors could not be accused of class bias if they
tried wealthy men.4 6 The state's power to seize the property of any-
one convicted of treason may have been another incentive to accuse
the wealthy. Although the seizures proved to be unprofitable for the
new regime, the government seized part of the Penn family lands
SON & CIVIL LIBERTIES, THE DARKER SIDE (1963) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL LIBERTIES]; L.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960) [hereinafter cited as LEGACY].
41. N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 18 (1784).
42. In 1781, Virginia indicted leaders of draft riots for treason, B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at
74. After the victory at Yorktown, Virginia indicted many more British supporters; although
many were sentenced to hang for treason, all were pardoned by the Virginia legislature. Id at 62.
After discussing the uses of treason law, including forfeiture, Chapin concluded that the liberal
use of the pardon power and the reluctance to use capital punishment undercut the harshness of
the statutory language: "Only a tiny minority of those charged with treason ever experienced the
terror of the gallows .... There was no reign of terror. The record is one of substantial justice
done." Id at 71.
43. 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682-1801 at 18-19 (Harrisburg,
1896-1908).
44. B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 56.
45. R. CALHOON, THE LOYALISTS IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 1776-1781 at 397 (1973),
quoting General John Armstrong.
46. Prosecutor Joseph Reed explained:
[O]ut of the great number of assistants of the British army two of the most notorious
were convicted, but it would astonish you to observe the weight of interest exerted to
pardon them.., for none could be more guilty, but these being rich and powerful (both
Quakers) we could not for shame have made an example of a poor rogue after forgiving
the rich.
Reed to General Nathaniel Greene, Nov. 5, 1788, quotedin Meeham, The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in the Law and Politics of the Commonwealth 173 (Ph.D. diss., U. Wisc., 1960).
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and distributed it to government supporters.47 Out of the 113 people
initially detained for treason, forty-five were sent to the grand jury.
Twenty-two men were indicted and seventeen were tried.48
James Wilson led the defense in all the cases; he argued that
English law was relevant and that treason should be given a restric-
tive reading. Chief Justice McKean's notes indicated that Wilson
supported the English law because it was "ascertained and fixed."
The Attorney General responded: "What was treason at common
law, the arbitrary proceeding in arbitrary reigns are nothing to the
present question." Wilson countered, "[i]f the Statutes are not ex-
tended here, we shall be all afloat as if we were before the [English
statute]. '49 Considering the political climate, Wilson was remarka-
bly successful, since only three of the men were convicted. Two of
them, however, were sentenced to die.50 Despite numerous requests
for pardons, they were both hanged.51 After the hangings, virtually
everyone took the oath of allegiance and the Quakers no longer
challenged the legitimacy of the fledgling state government.5 2
Along with James Wilson, Thomas Jefferson was particularly
concerned about improper use of treason law. Jefferson bitterly
remembered when British General Gage proclaimed in 1774 that
citizens in Massachusetts committed treason if they assembled to
consider grievances and formed associations for such purposes.53
Jefferson noted, incorrectly, that the English statute had limited
treason to certain specified actions, not including protests: "[T]his
was done to take out of the hands of tyrannical Kings, and of weak
47. Boyd, Political Choice-Political Justice: The Case of the Pennsylvania Loyalists, in AMER-
ICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 47-48 (M. Belknap ed. 1981).
48. Id at 48.
49. J. HURST, supra note 24, at 119. Hurst believed that Wilson's defense of the Quakers and
his conservative interpretation of the law reflected personal beliefs. Id at 119. After the Revolu-
tion, Wilson reaffirmed his arguments in his lectures on law delivered to the College of Philadel-
phia in 1790 and 1791. Id at 11.
50. B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 58.
51. Boyd, supra note 47, at 52. Conclusions about the justice of treason cases vary dramati-
cally. Chapin concluded that the Quakers' trials "were examples ofjustice, not political reprisals."
B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 59. Boyd disagreed: "Justice was political during the Revolution and
because of the political choices they had made, in 1778 two Quakers became victims of this
politicized justice." Boyd, supra note 47, at 54. Hurst, who concentrated on statutory language
drafted during the Revolution, hedged: "None of the decisions in the Pennsylvania treason trials
mounted to the level of a legal classic, but the opinions are marked by judicial restraint and it
appears that the court was careful of the rights of the defendants." J. HURST, supra note 24, at 90.
Such diverse opinions about both the process and the resolution of political trials are common.
52. Boyd, supra note 47, at 54.
53. 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 206, 210 (Ford ed. 1893).
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and wicked Ministers, that deadly weapon, which constructive trea-
son has furnished them with, and which had drawn the blood of the
best and honest men in the kingdom."54 Jefferson believed that his
draft of the Continental Congress's recommendation-that each
state draft treason laws-usefully narrowed treason prosecution. He
had used "the very words of the established law," 55 which had legal
precedent resisting judicial expansion. Jefferson thought that once
punishment for compassing the king's death was excluded, construc-
tive treason would no longer be possible. Jefferson's and Wilson's
anxiety about treason was not just a reaction to mob violence or
tyranny by the crown; both men knew they had committed treason
by leading the Revolution. Furthermore, their treason was effective.
Jefferson was also concerned about the eagerness of other
Americans to use the death penalty. Less than two months after
writing the Declaration of Independence and the Continental Con-
gress's recommendation on treason, he agreed with Dr. Edmund
Pendleton's concern about excessively bloodthirsty laws, and explic-
itly considered the problem of executing traitors:
The fantastical idea of virtue and the public good being a sufficient
security to the state against the commission of crimes, which you say
you have heard insisted on by some, I assure you was never mine. It is
only the sanguinary hue of our penal laws which I meant to object to.
54. Id at 216.
55. Jeflerson's concern about treason was probably influenced by the writings of Montes-
quieu a French political philosopher and jurist. Montesquieu argued that the greatest threat to
political security came from public or private accusations, particularly improper charges of trea-
son: "If the crime of high treason be indeterminate, this alone is sufficient to make the govern-
ment degenerate into arbitrary power." MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRuT OF LAWS 197 (1914).
Montesquieu used history to support his theory that speech and writing should never be consid-
ered treason. A terrible example was the execution of Marsyas for dreaming that he had cut
Dionysius' throat: "This was a most tyrannical action: for though it had been the subject of his
thoughts, yet he had made no attempt toward it." Id at 204. Montesquieu recommended that the
law be limited to punishing appropriate overt acts, and that two witnesses be necessary in any
capital case. Id at 207. The two-witness requirement was particularly important in treason cases
since perjury was so likely. Id at 198. He concluded that moderation in punishing political
crimes was necessary to protect the republican form of government: "Under the pretence of
avenging the republic's cause, the avengers would establish tyranny. The business is not to de-
stroy the rebel, but the rebellion." Id at 211. Nevertheless, Montesquieu accepted the use of
capital punishment in treason cases. Id at 212. For a discussion of the influence of Montesquieu
and Beccaria on the framers of the Constitution, see Schwartz and Wishingrad, The Eighth
Amendment, Beccaria and the Enlightenment. An Historical Justifcation for the Weems v. United
States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783 (1975). I am less willing than the
authors to incorporate totally the views of the Enlightenment thinkers: "To ignore these philoso-
phers' theories of criminal law, therefore, would be tantamount to cutting oneself off from the very
meaning of the Constitution." Id at 813.
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Punishments I know are necessary, and I would provide them, strict
and inflexible, but proportioned to the crime. Death might be inflicted
for murther andperhapsfor treason ifyou would take out the description
of treason all crimes which are not such in their nature.56
D. The Drafting of the Treason Clause in the Constitution
The framers of the Constitution never heavily debated or ana-
lyzed the Constitution's treason clause. The initial proposals for the
Constitution, the Pinckney and the New Jersey plans, recommended
that Congress be allowed to define the crime. 57 However, the Com-
mittee of Detail, which included James Wilson, suggested that
"treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war
against them, or in adhering to their enemies. ' 58 Wilson probably
was responsible for this incorporation of English statutory
language.59
During the Convention, James Madison criticized the proposed
definition for being too narrow and for failing to leave adequate
discretion to Congress. 6° James Mason defended the narrow scope
by pointing out that old English law helped make the phrases more
definite.61 Since the Committee's proposal did not require any proof
of any overt act, nor any requirement that the overt act be observed
by two witnesses, the clause was amended; "Doctor Franklin wished
this amendment to take place-prosecutions for treason were gener-
ally virulent; and perjury too easily made use of against inno-
cence."6 2 The cursory debate also considered the federal aspects of
the crime. Madison argued that Congress and the states would have
concurrent power to punish treason against the states, but only Con-
gress could punish treason against the United States. 63
56. 1 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 505 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) (emphasis added).
57. B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 81.
58. J. HURST, supra note 24, at 129-30.
59. Id at 136. Although there is no absolute proof, Hurst believes that Wilson was the
author of the Committee's proposal. In his subsequent lectures to the Philadelphia College in
1790 and 1791, Wilson approved of the limitations on treason "In this manner, the citizens of the
Union are secured effectually from even legislative tyranny; and in this instance, as in many
others, the happiest, and most approved example of the other times has not only been imitated,
but excelled." 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 665 (R.G. McCloskey ed. 1967). Hurst believes
such enthusiasm reflected pride of authorship, J. HURST, supra note 24, at 136.
60. 2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 345-50 (1911).
These five pages summarize the August 20, 1787, discussion of treason.
61. Id
62. Id at 348.
63. Id at 346.
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Although the treason clause did not play a central role in the
ensuing ratification debates, there was some discussion of it.
Madison, now the advocate, applauded treason's restrictive defini-
tion in The Federalist, No. 43: "[Nlew-fangled and artificial trea-
sons have been the great engines by which violent factions, the
natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked their al-
ternate malignity of each other." 64 The Anti-Federalists never made
the seemingly obvious argument that the treason language gave too
much power to the central government due to its vagueness and its
incorporation of English law, including the common law concept of
"constructive treason" which defined riots as acts of levying war.65
During the Virginia Convention, Patrick Henry, an Anti-Federalist
leader, complained that the proposed Constitution allowed the pos-
sibility of "the most grievous oppressions." Federalist leader
George Nicholas used the treason clause as part of his rebuttal:
Treason consists in levying war against the United States, or in adher-
ing to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. The punishment for
this well-defined crime is to be declared by Congress; no oppression,
therefore, can arise on this ground. This security does away the objec-
tion that the most grievous oppressions might happen under color of
punishing crimes against the general government. The limitation of the
forfeiture to the life of the criminal is also an additional privilege.
66
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 290 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Madison's initial
opposition to any definition seems odd given his fear that political factions could easily disrupt the
new government. See generalI G. WILLS, THE MAKING OF AMERICA (1981). Perhaps Madison
initially wanted Congress to have such power as part of his hope to increase the strength of the
central government. Id
65. According to the decisions of the English courts, in 1787, the levying of war upon the
king could consist in any effort by violence to fix or enforce public policy; and this was
taken to include forcible resistance to the general execution of a law, or the attempt by
force to deprive any class of the people of their rights under law, or to influence the king's
choice of counsellors .... This, however, was doctrine better suited to an age of royal
rather than of parliamentary power, and by the end of the eighteenth century English juries
had reflected this basic shift in constitutional politics by acquitting of 'treason' several nota-
ble defendants who, like Home Tooke or Lord George Gordon, had been at most guilty of
inciting to riot.
J. HURST, supra note 24, at 6.
66. 3 J. ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 102-03 (2d ed. 1907). Henry was more concerned about the
failure to outlaw cruel and unusual punishments.
Congress, from their general powers, may fully go into the business in human legislation.
They may legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the lowest offense-petty larceny.
They may define crimes and prescribe punishments. In the definition of crimes, I trust
they will be directed by what wise representatives ought to be governed by. But when we
come to punishments, no latitude ought to be: left, nor dependence put on the virtue of
representatives.
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Nicholas' argument did not prove to be completely satisfactory.
67
Professor Hurst believes that most leaders wanted flexibility in
defining treason to crush violent uprisings such as Shay's Rebellion,
which had occurred in Massachusetts the year before the Conven-
tion.68 Captured after their abortive revolt, twelve members of the
revolt were sentenced to death. Their fate was an important cam-
paign issue in 1787, when John Hancock defeated Governor James
Bowdoin, who wanted the rebels to die.69 Hancock stopped all the
executions but that of one defendant (who was apparently guilty of
theft), and later pardoned the rest, including Shay.70
E American Application of Treason After the Constitution
When Congress first convened in 1790, it immediately used its
constitutionally granted power to establish the penalty for treason:
traitors could be hanged until dead.7' That same statute also incor-
porated the procedural protections found in England's Trial of
Treasons Act: the defendant was to receive both a copy of the in-
dictment and a list of witnesses at least three days before trial, he
had the right to counsel and use of the court's power to subpoena
Id at 447.
Again Nicholas relied upon the treason clause to rebut Henry.
But the gentleman says that . . . we are not free from torture. Treason against the
United States is defined in the Constitution, and the forfeiture limited to the life of the
person attainted. Congress have power to define and punish piracies and felonies com-
mitted on the high seas, and offences against the laws of nations; but they cannot define
or prescribe the punishment of any other crime whatever, without violating the
Constitution.
Id at 451. Nicholas's views of Congress' limited power proved wrong. See also J. HURST, supra
note 24, at 155-60.
67. The.first amendment was added as additional protection against political tyranny. See
generally J. HURST, supra note 24, at 155-60, for a discussion of the relationship between the
treason clause and the first amendment. Nicholas's argument did not prove to be completely
satisfactory, particularly to refute the Anti-Federalists' claim that the people needed the additional
protection of a written Bill of Rights. The Anti-Federalists rejected the Federalists' argument that
the treason clause provided adequate protection for freedom of speech and assembly, making the
first amendment unnecessary. The first amendment was added as additional protection against
political tyranny.
68. Id at 127, 140 n.27.
69. H. APTHEKER, EARLY YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC 144-48 (1976).
70. Id at 146.
71. 1 Stat. 112 (1790), 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1976). The statute later was enlarged to include the
alternative penalties of fines and imprisonment. This prompt use of the death penalty is powerful
and relevant proof that the framers of the Constitution believed that such a sanction was constitu-
tional. Since the 1790 act was passed the year after the Constitution was ratified, it is particularly
significant in determining original intentions.
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witnesses, and he could peremptorily challenge thirty-five potential
jurors.
72
The leaders of the new government aggressively used treason
prosecutions against their political enemies. Many of the Constitu-
tion's advocates, including Wilson and Jefferson, worked together in
1794 to defeat the Whiskey Rebellion, a violent protest in Western
Pennsylvania against the collection of federal whiskey excise taxes.
An armed mob had burned down a tax collector's house; there had
been sporadic gunfire. Proposals were made to a crowd of five thou-
sand to attack a federal fort in Pittsburgh, but the group decided
instead to conduct a noisy march through the city.73 Alexander
Hamilton, the originator of the tax, was eager to use the federal gov-
ernment's treason power and military power to crush the dissent; he
successfully argued that the militia should be called out. But while
an army of thirteen thousand was being assembled, the opposition
disintegrated and many of the leaders fled. Thirty-five indictments
for treason were sent to the grand jury, but only two men, John
Mitchell and Philip Vigol, were convicted.74 The main legal issue at
the trials was the proper use of the two-witness requirement.75 Re-
jecting Mitchell's argument, the trial court adopted the English doc-
trine construing "levying of war" to include armed political protest:
"By the English authorities, it is uniformly and clearly declared,
that raising a body of men to obtain, by intimidation or violence, the
repeal of a law, or to oppose and prevent by force and terror, the
execution of a law, is an act of levying war."76 In United States v.
Vigo, 77 the trial court concluded that high treason occurred when-
72. Id
73. B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 86. James Wilson, by then a Justice of the Supreme Court,
certified that the process of justice no longer existed in Western Pennsylvania. Id Jefferson
signed the official proclamation against the rebellion. CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 40, at 160.
There was no split between the Federalists and the Republicans over suppressing this rebellion.
74. B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 87-88. For a more detailed discussion of the Whiskey Re-
bellion, see B. LELAND, WHISKEY REBELS: THE STORY OF A FRONTIER UPRISING (1939).
75. B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 88. For example, four witnesses saw Mitchell at a meeting
prior to the attack on the tax collector's house, but only one witness claimed definitely to have
seen Mitchell at the actual attack. The court concluded that the two episodes were a continuous
event, thereby satisfying the two-witness rule. Id
76. United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1277, 1278 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 15, 788). The
district attorney in Mitchell's case argued that the difference between English and American gov-
ernments was irrelevant: levying war "must be the same, in technical interpretation, whether com-
mitted under a republican, or regal, form of government." Id
77. 28 F. Cas. 376 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16, 621). Another tax revolt, the Fries Rebellion,
also concluded with treason trials. Samuel Chase conducted the trial while claiming also to de-
fend the unrepresented Fries. Chase held that intention was the factor that distinguished treason
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ever an armed party attempted to render any Act of Congress null
and void. A traitor, therefore, need not intend to overthrow the
government. Both men were sentenced to die, but President Wash-
ington pardoned them and all the others who had fled.
When the Republicans gained power in 1800, led by Thomas
Jefferson, they also used treason prosecutions against their political
enemies.78 Aaron Burr's alleged scheme-to become leader of a
new nation in the western part of the country-led to several spec-
tacular treason cases. The alleged "overt act" of levying war took
place when a group of twenty armed men floated in rafts down the
Ohio River. The only violence consisted of the group's threatening
to kill a man who grabbed one of the leaders just before the voyage
began.79
One of Burr's supporters, Dr. Eric Bollman, was the first to be
tried. Bollman was willing to talk to Jefferson about the plot, but
Jefferson was disappointed when Bollman said that Burr only
wanted to conquer Mexico, not seize New Orleans and separate the
West from the rest of the country. Jefferson convinced Bollman to
put a confession in writing, and offered "his word of honour that
they shall never be used against himself [Bollman], and that thepa-
per shall never go out of his hand."80 Jefferson then sent the signed
confession to the United States Attorney, George Hay, advising Hay
to use it only to structure the questioning or for impeachment pur-
poses if Bollman contradicted the confession. Jefferson later told
Hay to use the document affirmatively in trial.81 Jefferson also of-
from riot, while force was an element necessary to both crimes. Chase ordered that Fries should
be hanged because it would be expensive to imprison Fries and his death would deter others:
"The end of all punishment is example." Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 934 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No.
5, 126). Rejecting the advice of his cabinet that Fries should be killed, President Adams pardoned
Fries and all the others associated with him. See generally B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 91-97.
78. After a young slave led an unsuccessful revolt in 1800, James Monroe wrote Jefferson,
asking him how the many hundreds of slaves should be punished. Jefferson recommended that
Monroe exercise whatever mercy he could. That mercy was scant-thirty-five slaves were exe-
cuted while the rest were sold into slavery in the West Indies. See H. APTHEKER, supra note 69,
147-48.
79. B. CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 99. The Burr story has been told many times. See generally
W. MCCALAB, THE AARON BURR CONSPIRACY (1936); T. ABERNETHY, THE BURR CONSPIRACY
(1968); and N. SCHACHNER, AARON BURR, A BIOGRAPHY (1961).
80. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Eric Bollman (Jan. 25, 1807), reprinted in 2 M. DAVIS,
MEMOIRS OF AARON BURR 388 (1837). The words are allegedly Jefferson's, while the italics were
presumably added by Davis or Bollman.
81. See generally correspondence between Jefferson and Hay in 1807, in 9 THOMAS JEFFER-
SON: CORRESPONDENCE PRINTED FROM THE ORIGINALS IN THE COLLECTION OF WILLIAM K.
BIXBY 52-63 (W. Ford ed. 1916).
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fered to pardon Boliman, who indignantly refused the offer since
acceptance would imply guilt.82
All of Jefferson's manuevers failed. Chief Justice Marshall
wrote an opinion for the Supreme Court holding that the evidence
against Boliman was insufficient to support a treason indictment;
Bollman's habeas corpus petition was granted.8 3 Marshall discussed
the danger of treason prosecutions: "As there is no crime which can
more excite and agitate the passions of men than treason, no charge
demands more from the tribunal before which it is made a deliber-
ate and temperate inqiiiy." 8 4 Marshall agreed with the policy, im-
plied in the Constitution, to narrow the scope of the crime to avoid
"those calamaties which result from the extension of treason to of-
fence of minor importance."8 5 Levying war must be more than con-
spiracy to levy war. Once treason has occurred, however, all
involved would be considered traitors:
It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty
of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his country. On the
contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually
assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose,
all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote
from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general
conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors. But there must be an actual
assembling of men ... to constitute a levying of war.86
One would have thought that Burr would then be easily convicted.
Jefferson's frustration turned to rage when Marshall, sitting as
Circuit Judge, dismissed the treason charge against Burr. Burr had
not been present when the small group sailed down the Ohio River
and the prosecution had not pled in its indictment that Burr was
constructively at the island. Marshall held that the indictment was
defective: "[T]hat the conviction of the principal must precede the
indictment of the accessory; that the indictment must be specific;
82. 1 REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR... FOR TREASON, AND FOR A
MISDEMEANOR ... IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 21-30 (D. Robertson ed.
1808).
83. Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swartwout, 7 U.S. (4 Cranch) 23, 42 (1807).
84. Id at 36. Marshall criticized frequent use of constructive treasons: "[T]he crime of trea-
son should not be 8xtended by construction to doubtful cases; and. . . crimes not clearly within
the constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislative in its wisdom may
provide." Id at 37-38.
85. Id at 36.
86. Id at 37.
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that the charge must be proved as laid. ' 87 Jefferson's fury over-
whelmed his hatred of tyranny-
I did wish to see these people get what they deserved; and under the
maxim of the law itself, that inter arma silsent leges, that in an encamp-
ment expecting daily attack from a powerful enemy, self-preservation is
paramount to all law, I expected that instead of invoking the forms of
law to cover traitors, all good citizens would have concurred in securing
them. Should we have ever gained our Revolution, if we had bound
our hands by manacles of the law, not only in the beginning, but in any
part of the revolutionary conflict? There are extreme cases where the
laws become inadequate even to their own preservation, and where the
universal resource is a dictator, or martial law.
88
Prior to the Civil War, treason charges were brought against a
variety of political and religious leaders, such as Joseph Smith, the
Mormon leader; Thomas Wilson Dorr, leader of a revolt in 1844 in
Rhode Island; and John Brown, organizer of the attack on Harper's
Ferry. The fates of these three men indicate the passions always
found behind such charges. Smith was taken out of his jail by a
mob and lynched; Dorr was convicted and sentenced to prison; and
Brown was executed.89
The trial of Castner Hanway provides the best example of how
easily a citizen could be charged with treason. Several Southerners
were pursuing runaway slaves into Pennsylvania under the author-
ity of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law. When they arrived at a farm-
house and served the owner, William Parker, who was also a
runaway slave, with a warrant for the slaves, Parker told them that
there would be armed resistance. During the discussion, several
armed blacks appeared, as did Castner Hanway, a white man who
sympathized with the slaves and had written several pamphlets op-
posing slavery and the Fugitive Slave Law. The United States Dep-
uty, riding with the slaveowner, commanded Hanway "to aid and
assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this law." Hanway
refused, recommending instead that the posse leave. When the
posse refused, shots were fired. By the time the skirmish ended, the
slaveowner was dead; his son was seriously wounded; and a cousin
was severely beaten. The deputy and three others escaped un-
87. See supra note 82, at 13-18.
88. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. James Brown (Oct. 27, 1808) reprinted in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 211 (Ford ed. 1898).
89. J. HURST, supra note 24, at 263-64. In his appendix, Hurst lists thirty-five instances in
which the federal treason clause was interpreted by courts. Id at 260-67.
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harmed, while the blacks fled to Canada.90 The South was outraged
at the episode, and President Filmore agreed that charging Hanway
with treason would be useful even if the legal case were weak.91
The government apparently had a sympathetic judge, who told
the grand jury that treason "embraces not merely the act of formal
or declared war, but any combination forcibly to prevent or oppose
the execution or enforcement of a provision of the constitution or of
a public statute, if accompanied or followed by an act of forcible
opposition in pursuance of such combination." 92 Part of Hanway's
alleged treason was his publication and distribution of books and
pamphlets which "contain[ed] therein, amongst other things, incite-
ment, encouragement, and exhortations, to move, induce, and per-
suade persons held to service (slavery) in any of the United States
by the laws thereof, who had escaped . .. to resist, oppose, and
prevent by violence and intimidation, the execution of the said
laws." 93 By the end of the trial, the judge had modified the scope of
treason: "Resistance of the execution of a law of the United States
accompanied with any degree of force, if for a private purpose, is
not treason." 94 In addition, the judge held that the jury should not
extend treason to doubtful cases. The jury acquitted Hanway.95
The Civil War was a massive act of treason, no matter how
narrowly the term is defined. On July 17, 1862, Congress authorized
a fine of up to $10,000 and punishment-varying from five years of
hard labor to death-for anyone convicted of insurrection, conspir-
acy, or treason. 96 Political criminal charges were brought against
several Indiana Democrats, including Lambdin Milligan, who vi-
ciously criticized Lincoln while running for governor in 1864.
When one of Milligan's political allies, H.H. Dodd, was discovered
associating with the Confederates, the Republican Governor
counterattacked by calling all of Dodd's associates traitors. Dodd
was arrested by a military tribunal after proposing revolt. After
Dodd escaped, similar charges were brought against Milligan, who
90. Finkelman, The Treason Trial of Castner Hanway, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 85-
86 (M. Belknap ed. 1981).
91. Id at 88.
92. Charge to the Grand Jury-Treason, 39 F. Cas. 1047, 1048-49 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (No.
18, 276).
93. The indictment is reprinted in J. ROBBINS, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF CASTNER HANWAY
FOR TREASON 18-19 (1852).
94. United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 105, 128 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (No. 15, 299).
95. Finkelman, supra note 90, at 96.
96. J. ARCHER, TREASON IN AMERICA 58-59 (1971).
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was convicted and sentenced to die. As a result, the Democrats were
defeated at the election.97 But after the war, the Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction because Milligan should have been tried in
civilian courts instead of in the military court. The Court empha-
sized the danger of political tyranny arising through political
prosecutions:
Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise,
when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek
by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and
proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in
peril, unless established by irrepealable law. The history of the world
had taught them that what was done in the past might be attempted in
the future. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in the peace, and covers with the shield of
its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circum-
stances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was
ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a
doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of neces-
sity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Consti-
tution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve
its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great effort
to throw off its just authority.98
97. Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials and Ex Parte Milligan, in AMERICAN POLIT-
ICAL TRIALS 103-113 (M. Belknap ed. 1981). Milligan was charged and convicted of:
1. Conspiracy against the government of the United States
2. Affording aid and comfort to the rebels against the authority of the United States
3. Inciting insurrection
4. Disloyal practices
5. Violations of the laws of war.
Id at 110.
98. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866). But the Milligan court apparently
accepted the use of the death penalty for certain political crimes.
Open resistance to the measures deemed necessary to subdue a great rebellion, by those
who enjoy the protection of government, and have not the excuse even of prejudice of
section to plead in their favor, is wicked; but that resistance becomes an enormous crime
when it assumes the form of a secret political organization, armed to oppose the laws,
and seeks by stealthy means to introduce the enemies of the country into peaceful com-
munities, there to light the torch of civil war, and thus overthrow the power of the United
States. Conspiracies like these, at such a juncture, are extremely perilous; and those
concerned in them are dangerous enemies to their country, and should receive the heavi-
est penalties of the law, as an example to deter others from similar criminal conduct. It is
said the severity of the laws caused them; but Congress was obliged to enact severe laws
to meet the crisis; and as our highest civil duty is to serve our country when in danger,
the late war has proved that rigorous laws, when necessary, will be cheerfully obeyed by
a patriotic people, struggling to preserve the rich blessings of a free government.
Id at 130. Indeed, the government did not severely punish the rebels. Jefferson Davis was in-
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After the Civil War, the variety of indictments against political
opponents demonstrated how the Constitution's attempt to regulate
treason could easily be avoided by alleging or creating other crimes.
The leaders of the strike that led to the 1892 Homestead Riot were
charged with treason;99 Eugene Debs was convicted of violating the
Espionage Act for opposing the draft during World War I;100 Bill-
ings and Moody were convicted (probably improperly) of murder
after the July 22, 1915, Haymarket Square bombing;' 0 l and Jer-
emiah O'Leary was charged but acquitted of "conspiracy to commit
treason" for organizing an American division of the Sinn Fein soci-
ety, which opposed British occupation of Ireland. 10 2 It is difficult to
define clearly any political crime, much less to distinguish between
different types of political crimes.
United States v. Robinson10 3 is significant because of Judge
Learned Hand's opinion. Robinson had been charged with treason
because he had carried messages, and had made an anti-war speech
on August 17, 1917. Judge Hand narrowly construed the constitu-
tional definition of treason; not only must the two witnesses testify
to the whole overt act, but also the act itself must openly manifest
treasonous intent. Thus, the act could not be a neutral act; it had to
be an obviously political or violent act. Hand noted that the two-
witness rule dated back to the Spanish Inquisition, when two wit-
dicted for treason, but he was never tried. See Case of Jefferson Davis, 7 F. Cas. 63 (C.C.C.D. Va.
1867-1871) (No. 3, 63 Ia). See also Watson, Trial of Jefferson Davis, 24 YALE L.J. 669 (1915).
President Johnson's pardon prevented any treason trials from being completed.
99. The Chief Justice's charge to the grand jury was extremely broad:
[A] mere mob, collected upon the impulse of the moment, without any definite ob-
ject beyond the gratification of its sudden passions, does not commit treason, although it
destroys property and takes human life.
But when a large number of men arm and organize themselves by divisions and
companies, appoint officers and engage in a common purpose to defy the law, to resist its
officers, and to deprive any portion of their fellow-citizens of the rights to which they are
entitled under the Constitution and laws, it is a levying of war against the state, and the
offense is treason.
Commonwealth v. O'Donnel, 12 Pa. C. 97, 104-05 (1892) (Paxson, C.J.). Hurst concluded that
such attempts to create "constructive treasons" were rare; the O'Donnel case "met with prompt
and unanimous criticism from conservative professional sources." J. HURST, supra note 24, at
200.
100. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
101. J. ARCHER, supra note 96, at 63-68.
102. Id at 72. The jury may have acquitted O'Leary in part because one witness was ex-
posed as a spy and another as a perjurer. Id
103. 259 F. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
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nesses were needed to prove heresy.'0 4 Judge Hand was taking a
stricter approach to political crimes than was the Supreme Court,
which affirmed the convictions of such dissenters as Debs,
l05 Stil-
son, 06 and Schaefer. 10
7
The trial of Communist organizer Angelo Herndon for "at-
tempting to incite insurrection" against the State of Georgia pro-
vides another dramatic example of the inherently elusive definitions
of political crimes and of the peculiar nature of political trials,
which more than any other type of trial evolve into forums for de-
bate, not for ascertaining particular facts.'08 During the Depression,
Herndon helped organize in Georgia a racially mixed demonstra-
tion requesting emergency relief. After the county commissioners
voted $6,000 in relief, the police arrested Herndon, a black born in
Ohio, because he had tried to recruit members for the Communist
Party and had distributed such literature as the Daily Worker. The
death penalty was authorized for conviction under the state statute
outlawing insurrection. 10 9
The trial was sordid. The Assistant Solicitor referred to
Herndon as "this darkey." Another prosecutor conveniently blurted
out during questioning about equal rights for Negroes: "You un-
derstand that to mean the right of a colored boy to marry your
daughter, if you have one?" Herndon's testimony consisted of the
proud declaration of his allegiance to the Communist Party and to
the goal of organizing white and black workers so that they could
fight their mutual enemy, the capitalists. Both sides concluded with
passionate closing arguments. Having joined the Communist Party
the night before, Herndon's attorney said that "[a]ny other verdict
[aside from not guilty] will be a mockery ofjustice; any other verdict
will be catering to the basest passion of race prejudice. . . ." The
prosecutor begged the jury to "send this damnable anarchistic Bol-
104. Id at 691-92.
105. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
106. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583 (1919).
107. Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1919).
108. Professor Kirchheimer argues that political trials are different from ordinary criminal
trials in part because "[ifn such cases legal and political considerations constantly intertwine and
the outcome of official deliberations depends as much on the political goals of the incumbent
administration as on the feasibility consideration of its legal technicians." 0. KIRCHHEIMER,
POLITICAL JUSTICE 196 (1961). Kirchheimer discusses the differences in detail. Id at 48-53.
109. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 245-46 (1936).
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sheviki" to the electric chair. 110 The jury found Herndon guilty, but
recommended mercy."' Herndon received a lengthy prison
sentence.
Herudon's first appeal to the Supreme Court was denied for
lack of jurisdiction,1 2 but his successful habeas corpus petition pro-
vided the court full review of the statute and the conviction. The
majority applied the "clear and present danger" test by analyzing
the statute to determine if Herndon could "reasonably foretell"
what action was insurrection."13 Although the Court did not strike
down the statute for being so vague as to be facially unconstitu-
tional, the Court held that: "[T]he statute as construed and applied,
amounts merely to a dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agi-
tates for a change of government if a jury can be persuaded that he
ought to have foreseen his words would have some effect on the
future conduct of others."" 4 Most political speeches have just such
an intent: since Herndon was charged only with speaking, recruit-
ing, and distributing literature, the case was remanded. Georgia did
not pursue the case; Herndon was set free after five years in jail.' 1 5
This due process argument of adequate advance notice can be used
to demand a more precise definition of treason, particularly when
the prosecution seeks death.
In the aftermath of World War II, the Supreme Court reviewed
three treason convictions. Since Ex Parte Bollman only decided
that the government had not presented adequate evidence to war-
rant commitment of Burr's associate on a treason charge for levying
war, the Court was fully interpreting the treason clause for the first
time. The three World War II cases are arguably inconsistent-
each side has precedent to support broad or narrow interpretations
of which overt acts are adherence to the enemy. The possible incon-
110. See generally Martin, The Angelo Herndon Case and Southern Justice, in AMERICAN
POLITICAL TRIALS 117-99, at 177 (M. Belknap ed. 1981).
111. Id at 187.
112. Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935).
113. 301 U.S. at 262. Do the treason definitions provide any more guidance to a political
dissident attempting to reasonably foretell which of his planned actions are illegal? Since the
doctrine of constructive treason still exists, at least in defining the term levying war, a defendant
could argue that such a definition is unconstitutionally vague. Yet it is a bit absurd to argue that
the Constitution's own language is unconstitutionally vague. The framers were aware of the am-
biguity in the treason clause, and welcomed the flexibility the language gave them. Perhaps the
similarity between a proper definition of insurrection and treason's definitions explains why the
Court chose to remand the case rather than hold that the statute was unconstitutional on its face.
114. Id at 263-64.
115. Martin, supra note 110, at 194.
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sistency is vivid because two of the cases emerged out of the same
series of events. During the war, the F.B.I. arrested eight German
saboteurs who had landed on the Florida coast in rubber rafts
launched from a U-Boat. The Germans were tried for war crimes
by a military tribunal and were not given the right to a jury, which
they claimed violated the sixth amendment. The Supreme Court
disagreed, holding in Ex Parte Quirin" 6 that Congress had the
power to create such tribunals and that the Constitution did not re-
quire juries in such cases, partially because civilians and uniformed
prisoners have more rights than spies. Although most of the sabo-
teurs had once been American citizens, the Court rejected their ad-
ditional argument that the law of treason, with its constitutionally
required standards and procedures, had to be applied; the Court
summarily stated that the absence of uniform is an essential part of
the war crimes case, but is irrelevant in treason cases. 117 Justice
Holmes, in Frohwerk v. United States,1" 8 had previously rejected
similar arguments that treason preempted all other political crimes
and that the constitutional standards had to be strictly complied
with. With a lack of analysis similar to the deficient analysis in the
Quirin case, Holmes wrote:
Some reference was made in the proceedings and in argument to the
provision in the Constitution concerning treason, and it was suggested
on the one hand that some of the matters dealt with in the Act of 1917
were treasonable and punishable as treason or not at all, and on the
other that the acts complained of not being treason could not be pun-
ished. These suggestions seem to us to need no more than to be
stated.1 9
Holmes could have argued that the framers never intended treason
to be the exclusive political crime; the Alien and Sedition Act was
passed in 1798. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court should be reluc-
116. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
117. Id at 38.
118. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
119. Id at 210. Professor Hurst was disappointed in Holmes's conclusory analysis, given the
extensive evidence that the framers of the Constitution feared that treason prosecutions could be
abused. The procedural and definitional protections would be virtually meaningless if they could
be ignored merely by not labelling the crime as treason. Yet the Alien and Sedition Act was
passed almost immediately after the drafting of the Constitution; therefore, treason was not the
only conceivable political crime. Hurst tentatively agrees with Holmes's result, if not with his
methodology. But Hurst concludes: "[Tihe restrictive definition of treason carries an admonition
of policy concerning the application of such statutes which has not yet been presented with its due
weight of persuasion." J. HURST, supra note 24, at 166.
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tant to allow the government to escape the requirements of the trea-
son clause.
The treason clause also was raised with respect to two Ameri-
cans who had contacts with the saboteurs. The F.B.I. had discov-
ered the Germans' plot near its inception and had put the saboteurs
under surveillance, during which the spies contacted Cramer, a
friend of one of the saboteurs when the saboteur lived in America,
and Haupt, father of one of the spies. Unlike the saboteurs, Haupt
and Cramer were tried and convicted of treason in federal district
court. Cramer received a forty-five year prison sentence, 20 while
Haupt was initially sentenced to die. When his case was retried,
Haupt received life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.'
2'
Constrained by the two-witness requirement, 22 the government
could prove only that Cramer twice had lunches with several of the
Germans; were those meals "overt acts," as defined in the Constitu-
tion? Cramer proposed Learned Hand's restrictive interpretation in
Robinson by arguing that the meals did not demonstrate in them-
selves any intention to adhere to the enemy. The prosecution rec-
ommended use of traditional conspiracy law-any act which
furthers the conspiracy in any way is an overt act. The govern-
ment's secondary argument, held in reserve, was that Cramer gave
aid and comfort to the spies by publicly mingling with them so that,
seen with a respectable American, they would be less visible.1
23
Setting aside Cramer's conviction, Justice Jackson wrote the
opinion for five members of the Court. Jackson's review of the his-
tory of treason emphasized the framers' fear of abuse. Jackson re-
jected definitions of "overt" acts proposed by both sides: "The very
120. The trial court said at the time of sentencing, "I shall not impose the maximum penalty
of death. It does not appear that this defendant Cramer was aware that Thiel and Kerling [the
German Saboteurs] were in possession of explosives or other means for destroying factories and
property in the United States or planned to do that. . . . If there were any proof that they had
confided in him what their real purposes were, or that he knew or believed what they really were, I
should not hesitate to impose the death penalty." Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1944)
(quoting trial court).
121. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 632 (1947). See 47 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Il. 1942),
rev'd, 136 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1943). (The first case was reversed for a violation of the McNabb
rule and improper joinder of defendants.) The subsequent conviction was affirmed by the court of
appeals, 152 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1946).
122. Cramer took some of the saboteurs' funds for safekeeping, but this fact was not consid-
ered by the Supreme Court in determining intent, even though Cramer had admitted the deed:
"[The protection of the two-witness rule extends at least to all acts of the defendant which are
used to draw incriminating inferences that aid and comfort have been given." 325 U.S. at 33.
123. Id at 37-38.
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minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason pros-
ecution is that it show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting,
to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort
to the enemy."1 24 Lunch for three was not enough.
While Jackson's case-by-case technique could not provide clear
direction for the future, it avoided limiting treason to actual partici-
pation in violent deeds, as Cramer had proposed, or expanding trea-
son to include any knowing contact with any enemy agent. Either
of those interpretations would have been easier to apply. Professor
George Fletcher characterized Jackson's compromise as a blending
of the overt act requirement with the substantive standard of aiding
and abetting. 125
Jackson's test was used to sustain the conviction of Hans Haupt
two years later. Haupt had provided a downstairs apartment for his
son (who was one of the saboteurs), bought him a car, and helped
him get a job at a defense plant. Although such actions were consis-
tent with the normal responses of a loving father, Haupt knew that
his son was working for Germany and thus knowingly helped the
German cause. Such assistance,' 26 given to a known enemy, pro-
vided sufficient proof of aiding and abetting; the government did
not have to show "proof of purpose" or "unequivocal" acts, and the
jury could reasonably infer treasonous intent from Haupt's aid.' 27
Justice Douglas consistently wanted the Court to expand the
definition of treason to cover any overt act which proved the de-
fendant had moved from the realm of thought to the realm of ac-
tion. He dissented in Cramer because Cramer had acted by eating
with the enemy. In Haupt, Douglas concurred, criticizing the plu-
rality for convicting Haupt while freeing Cramer since there was no
meaningful distinction between the two cases.'2 8
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy agreed with Douglas
that there was no distinction between Cramer and Haupt; Haupt
also should not have been convicted of treason. Murphy applied
Judge Hand's definition of an overt act-the act must be "consistent
only with the treasonable intention."' 29 Using as an example a citi-
zen's giving a military map to a known saboteur, Murphy argued
124. Id at 34 (footnote omitted).
125. Fletcher, The Casefor Treason, 41 MD. L. REv. 193, 204 (1982).
126. 330 U.S. at 635.
127. Id at 641.
128. Id at 644-46 (Douglas, J., concurring).
129. Id at 647 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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that the act must manifest "treason beyond all reasonable doubt."1 30
Haupt's aid to his son was too ambiguous to prove treasonous in-
tent. By so limiting the types of acts that could be used to infer
treasonous intent, Murphy was reserving use of the crime against
the most obviously dangerous traitors.
Douglas's broad interpretation of the clause gained influence
when he wrote the opinion, agreed to by four Justices, in Kawakita v.
United States.131 Kawakita, an American of Japanese descent, had
supported Japan prior to the war. Kawakita lived in Japan before
the two countries declared war and remained in Japan after Pearl
Harbor. He worked in a war materials factory during the war.
While at the factory, he supervised several American prisoners of
war, frequently swearing at them and beating them. Justice
Douglas first rejected, as a nonreviewable jury decision, Kawakita's
argument that he had renounced his citizenship and consequently
could not be tried for treason. Douglas found that Kawakita's hos-
tility to the prisoners was treason. Dicta in the opinion indicated
that working in the factory might have been sufficient: "In these
days of total war manpower becomes critical and everyone who can
be placed in a productive position increases the strength of the en-
emy to wage war." 132 Douglas seized upon Chief Justice Marshall's
dicta in Ex Parte Bollman to affirm the broad scope of treason: "If
war be actually levied. . . all those who perform any part, however
minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are
actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as
traitors."133
Another recent episode demonstrates the uses and abuses in-
herent in the prosecution of those charged with political crimes.
William Bell harmed national security by selling to a Polish agent
documents describing the F-15's radar system, the weaknesses of the
TOW anti-armor missile (which hits its moving target so long as the
gunner keeps the cross hairs of the viewer on the target), and the
techniques explaining "quiet radar," which was to be used on the B-
130. Id at 648.
131. 343 U.S. 717 (1952). Justices Clark and Frankfurter did not participate in the case.
Justices Black and Burton joined Chief Justice Vinson's dissent, which stated that Kawakita had
renounced his citizenship during the war and thus could not be convicted of treason. Id at 745-
46.
132. Id at 734.
133. 8 U.S. 45, 126 (1807).
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1 Bomber.' 34 Bell was convicted of treason, but was sentenced to
only eight years in prison because he had helped the FBI trap the
Polish spy, who was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The handling of the political trials discussed above validates
political scientist Otto Kirchheimer's view that such cases are radi-
cally different from other criminal cases. The prosecution may have
many motives for bringing cases, and the inevitably vague definition
of any political crime creates a temptation to attack any perceived
political enemy. This country has not been immune from such be-
havior. Outlawing the death penalty is one way to preserve the ex-
isting flexibility inherent in treason's two definitions while
preventing the administration from being tempted to kill, either un-
necessarily or improperly, its political opponents. With this back-
ground, we can now consider the primary legal argument that
would probably be made against the killing of those guilty of trea-
son: execution would constitute illegal "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" under the eighth amendment.
III. HISTORY OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
A. The Framers' Interpretation
The eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment also evolved from English law. According to Anthony
Grannuci, something was lost in the transportation. Grannuci be-
lieves that the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which prohibited cruel
and unusual punishments, was drafted to outlaw excessive punish-
ments, not to prohibit certain punishments, such as torture, for be-
ing cruel per se. But the Constitutional framers used the latter
meaning, perhaps because there was so little English precedent actu-
ally applying the language. 35
When the Virginia delegates met in 1776 to decide if they
should declare independence from Great Britain, they also consid-
ered internal affairs and drafted a Declaration of Rights. George
Mason proposed a bill of rights and a constitution, including a sec-
tion which adopted the prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishments contained within the English Bill of Rights of 1689. That
same language was used later by eight other states and by the fed-
134. Sixty Minutes, March 14, 1982, Vol. XIV, Number 24, at 5-6 (transcript, CBS Televi-
sion Network broadcast, 7:00-8:00 P.M., EST).
135. Granucci, supra note 23.
HeinOnline  -- 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 129 1983-1984
130 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
eral government in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.136 Grannuci
agrees with Leonard Levy that the clause became constitutional
"boiler-plate"-undebated rhetoric that did not interest the
politicians. 137
But the Anti-Federalists claimed that the failure to include such
amendments in a bill of rights flawed the proposed Federal Consti-
tution. Patrick Henry feared the use of tortures and other barbarous
punishments if there were no prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments. 138 After initially denying the need for amendments,
the Federalists silenced such criticisms by including a Bill of Rights.
Discussion about the eighth amendment was limited; two members
of the First Congress briefly complained about the phrase's
ambiguity: 39
MR. SMITH, (of South Carolina), objected to the words 'nor cruel and
unusual punishments;' the import of them being too indefinite.
MR. LIVERMORE (of New Hampshire)-the clause seems to express
a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it;
but it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary....
No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes nec-
essary to hang a man, villians often deserve whipping, and perhaps
having their ears cut off, but are we in future to be prevented from
136. Id at 840.
137. Id at 840-41. Professor Levy has made a career out of revealing the nonlibertarian
actions of the framers. His description of the amendment process is sarcastic.
The history of the writing of the first American bills of rights and constitutions simply
does not bear out the presupposition that the process was a diligent or systematic one.
Those documents, which we uncritically exalt, were imitative, deficient, and irrationally
selective. In the glorious act of framing a social compact expressive of the supreme law,
Americans tended simply to draw up a random catalogue of rights that seemed to satisfy
their urge for a statement of first principles-or for some of them. That task was executed
in a disordered fashion that verged on ineptness. The inclusion or exclusion of any par-
ticular right neither proved nor disproved its existence in a state's colonial history.
L. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 411 (1968).
Other historians find the framers' commitment to liberty to be greater than in the present:
"Perhaps individual liberty has become a secondary concern, subordinate to the paramount issue
of safety of the nation. It is quite likely that the great men of the Revolution would be extremely
uncomfortable in such a climate of opinion, since they had risked their lives for the principle that
individual liberty was the sine qua non of good government." R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE
BILLS OF RIGHTS: 1776-1791, at 230 (1955). Historian Adrienne Koch praises Jefferson and
Madison without reservations: "For no other two men in the American past had a more pervasive
philosophy of democracy, a firmer faith in human intelligence, or a more progressive view of the
American experiment as a 'workshop of liberty.'" A. KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON iv (1964).
138. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 66, at 447-48.
139. Smith (South Carolina) and Livermore (New Hampshire) were the two members who
found the phrasing to be indefinite. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (1789).
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inflicting these punishments because they are cruel?' 40
The framers had available to them alternative constitutional
limitations on punishments which more clearly prohibited dispro-
portionate penalties and outlawed inherently brutal penalties. For
example, New Hampshire's Constitution had created a hierarchy of
crimes very relevant to this article's subject:
All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense. No
wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft,
forgery and the like, which they do to those of murder and treason;
where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offenses,
the people are led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves,
and to commit the most flagrant with as little compunction as they do
those of the lightest dye: For the same reason a multitude of sangui-
nary laws is both impolitic and unjust. The true design of all punish-
ments being to reform, not to exterminate, mankind. 41
An opponent of the death penalty in treason cases would have a
difficult time showing that his position is consistent with the fram-
ers' original conception of cruel and unusual punishment.
B. Supreme Court's De)nition of Cruel and Unusual Punishments
1. Early Cases
Wilkerson v. Utah 142 is the first Supreme Court case that con-
sidered the eighth amendment. Wilkerson was not challenging the
use of the death penalty, but only the decision to use a firing squad
instead of a noose. The Court concluded that such a form of execu-
tion was not cruelper se, particularly when compared to hanging. 143
This result is not surprising since the death penalty was used fre-
quently after the ratification of the Constitution. South Carolina
had authorized its use against 165 crimes, 44 while Kentucky re-
formed its laws by limiting the sanction to murder.145
140. See, e.g., R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE
29-58 (1982).
141. N.H. CONST., Bill of Rights art. 1, § 18 (1783), in I THE BILL OF RIGHTS 377 (B.
Schwartz ed. 1971) (emphasis added). South Carolina's Constitution recommended that the legis-
lature make punishments "more proportionate to the crime." S.C. CONST. § XL (1778), id at 335.
This sentiment had also been expressed in the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution, PA. CONST. § 38
(1776).
142. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
143. Id at 136-37.
144. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 250 (1973).
145. Id
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In Re Kemmler 146 reinforced the argument that the Wilkerson
Court had impliedly found the death penalty a permissible type of
punishment. The Kemmler Court distinguished cruel punishments
from the death penalty: "Punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution.
It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life."' 147 Casting doubt on the
strength of the above statement, perhaps reducing it to dictum, was
the Court's expressed doubt about the applicability of the eighth
amendment to the states. The Kemmler Court also observed that
the judiciary should defer generally to the legislature in choosing
the mode of execution. 48 The Court was adopting the framers'
views that the eighth amendment proscribed certain types of punish-
ments; the 1689 English statute's emphasis on proportionality was
not considered.
Two years later, three dissenting Justices in O'Neil v. Ver-
mont 149 added the factor of proportionality, stating that an other-
wise acceptable type of punishment could be cruel because it was
disproportionately severe, given the crime. O'Neil had been fined
$9,140 for 475 separate offenses of selling liquor without a license.
By ruling that the eighth amendment did not apply to the states, the
majority did not reach the merits of the state court's holding that the
punishment was not cruel because of the sentences' cumulative ef-
fect as long as no single punishment was excessive.150 Justice Field
dissented, maintaining that in comparison with other crimes, the se-
verity of the punishment was both unusual and cruel.' 5' Justice
Harlan agreed, noting the character of the offenses committed. 52
146. 136 U.S. 436 (1890). The majority referred to the Parliament Act of 1688 to support its
interpretation of cruelty:
So that, if the punishment prescribed for an offence against the laws of the State
were manifestly cruel and unusual, as burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the
wheel, or the like, it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge such penalties to be
within the constitutional prohibition.
Id at 446. Thus, the Court was misinterpreting an Act which was actually more concerned with
proportionality than with certain forms of punishment. See Granucci, supra note 23.
147. Kemmer, 133 U.S. at 447.
148. Id
149. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
150. Id at 331.
151. Id at 339 (Field, J., dissenting).
152. Id at 371 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Although for many years it was perceived as limited to its bi-
zarre facts, Weems v. United States'53 was the most important inter-
pretation of the eighth amendment prior to the recent death penalty
cases. In Weems, a majority of the Court held that an excessive
punishment could be an unconstitutionally cruel punishment.
Weems was a federal disbursing officer charged with intentionally
defrauding the United States Government in the Phillipine Islands
by making false entries concerning wage payments. After his con-
viction, Weems was sentenced to fifteen years in hard labor (con-
stantly having to wear chains on his ankles and wrists), a 4,000
pesetas fine, costs, and, upon release, loss of his rights to vote, to
hold public office, or to receive retirement pay.' 54 The prosecution
did not have to prove the element of intent to convict Weems under
the statute. After discussing the history of the eighth amendment
and prior Court interpretations, Justice McKenna concluded that
the eighth amendment was a dynamic part of the Constitution:
"Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and pur-
poses. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly
true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed
to meet passing occasions."'' 55
Justice McKenna compared Weems's punishment to punish-
ments authorized for other crimes-including certain degrees of
homicide, misprision of treason, forgery of bonds and robbery:
criminals convicted under those laws could not fare as poorly as had
Weems.156 McKenna rejected the government's argument that the
death penalty was more severe yet was not considered cruel, thereby
making Weems's appeal inappropriate since he had not received
that ultimate sanction: "It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and
that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in
its character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the
bill of rights, both on account of their degree and kind."'157
Seven years later, Oliver Wendell Holmes drastically reduced
the impact of Weems. Writing for an unanimous court in Badders v.
153. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Weems has been frequently analyzed. See Turkington, Unconsti-
lutionaly Excessive Punishments: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment andthe Weems Prindi-
pile, 3 CRiM. L. BULL. 145 (1967); Schwartz and Wishingrad, supra note 55.
154. 217 U.S. at 357-58.
155. Id at 373.
156. Id at 380.
157. Id at 377.
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United States,158 Holmes affirmed Badders's cumulative prison sen-
tence of thirty-five years for being convicted of seven separate of-
fenses of mail fraud by depositing seven letters into a box. Justice
Holmes refused to apply the Weems technique of comparing crimes
and their respective penalties to determine the constitutionality of a
given penalty. Holmes instead endorsed the holding in Howard v.
Fleming'5 9 where the Court had said, "[t]hat for other offenses
which may be considered by most, if not all, of a more grievous
character, less punishments have been inflicted does not make this
sentence cruel."1 60 Holmes's approach appeared to limit Weems to
its facts.
2. Pre-Modern Cases
The Supreme Court did not consider any other eighth amend-
ment cases until the 1940's. Implying once again that the death pen-
alty was constitutional, the Court affirmed a capital sentence for
kidnapping (with no murder) in Robinson v. United States in
1945.161 Two years later the Court rejected an inmate's claim that
his rights under the due process clauses and the eighth amendment
were violated when the state of Louisiana wanted to return him to
the electric chair after the first electrocution had failed.' 62 The
Resweber majority used Kemmler to hold that an unconstitutional
punishment had to be something worse than taking a life in the most
humane way possible: "The traditional humanity of modem Anglo-
American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the exe-
cution of the death sentence."' 63 Justice Frankfurter concurred in
the opinion nd commented that there are considerations aside from
necessity. "It [the eighth amendment] did mean to withdraw from
158. 240 U.S. 391 (1916). Holmes found that the apparently neutral act of mailing a letter
can be enough of an "overt act" to justify criminal conviction: "Intent may make an otherwise
innocent act criminal, if it is a step in a plot." Id at 394. Of course, it is not logically necessary
that the definition of "overt act" for most crimes should be the proper definition of "overt act" for
treason, since treason presents more difficult problems of definition and of prosecutorial abuse.
Badders' acceptance of cumulative sentences is factually similar to the ONeil opinion. Since
the O'Neil dissent had been accepted by the Weems majority, Holmes was telling all defendants
that comparative analysis of punishments for different crimes and/or challenges to cumulative
sentences were not going to be successful grounds for striking down most sentences. For years
Weems was not a very powerful precedent.
159. 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
160. Id at 135-36.
161. 324 U.S. 282 (1945).
162. Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
163. Id at 463.
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the States the right to act in ways that are offensive to a decent re-
spect for the dignity of man, and heedless of his freedom."' 64 De-
fendants then began challenging the process used in deciding if they
should be executed. 165
The conviction and execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg
for selling atomic secrets to the Russians has been a continual
source of controversy. Although the Supreme Court considered the
case several times and eventually affarmed the trial court's death
sentence, 66 the Court never discussed Judge Frank's rejection of the
164. Id at 468 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
165. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), was the first of a series of cases challenging
the constitutionality of the process used in determining who should die. Williams unsuccessfully
argued that he had a due process right to be able to cross-examine witnesses during the sentencing
hearing by the Court, particularly after the jury had recommended life imprisonment. The Court
concluded that the death penalty did not change normal procedural rights; although retribution
was not the dominant purpose of punishment, the punishment was directed at the offender, not
merely at the crime. Probation reports were useful for the trial court, and thus should be admit-
ted.
In Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), the Court held that an inmate had no right to
challenge the clemency process used to determine if he had become insane after he was sentenced
to death.
Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), rejected the defendant's double jeopardy argu-
ment and the defendant's contention that he could not be executed for kidnapping after he had
received only a life sentence for a murder in the same case. The Court preferred to defer to the
legislature: "But the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not, nor does any-
thing in the Constitution, require a State to fix or impose any particular penalty for any crime it
may define or to impose the same or 'proportionate sentences for separate and independent
crimes.' Id at 586.
In 1961, the Court overturned a Georgia law prohibiting a defendant in a capital case from
testifying under oath on his own behalf although he could make only a "statement." Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). In 1967, the Court held that a defendant's right to a jury in a
kidnapping case was unconstitutionally compromised when the law authorized the death penalty
only if the defendant requested a jury trial instead of a bench trial. United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570 (1968).
The power of the State to exclude as a matter of law all those who were opposed to capital
punishment was considered a violation of the defendant's right to be tried by a cross-section of the
community: "[This jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was enti-
tled .inder the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518
(1967).
Although the issue of the underlying validity of the death penalty was attacked in Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the Court reversed the conviction because the plea had not been
sufficiently voluntary--the defendant did not know what rights were being waived.
166. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838
(1952). The lengthy list of citations indicate the complex development of the case: cert. denied,
344 U.S. 838 (1952), reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 889 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1953), stay of
execution denied, 345 U.S. 989 (1953), reh'g denied, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953), motion for leave tofile
original writ of habeas corpus denied, 346 U.S. 271 (1953), stay vacated, 346 U.S. 273 (1953), stay
granted, 346 U.S. 313 (1953), stay denied, 346 U.S. 322 (1953), motion denied, 346 U.S. 324 (1953).
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Rosenbergs' claim that their execution would be unconstitutionally
cruel and unusual. Frank first noted that no such challenge had
ever successfully defeated a statute on its face; he assumed that the
statute was facially valid.167 He then dismissed the derivative argu-
ment that the death penalty was inappropriately applied; he held the
punishment did not "shock the conscience and sense of justice of the
people of the United States."' 68 Judge Frank conceded that the ap-
plication of the "shock the conscience" test was elusive at best. He
deferred to the trial court's assessment of the extent of injury caused
by the crime: "[I]t is impossible to say that the community is
shocked and outraged by such sentences resting on such facts."'
169
Frank also dismissed the Rosenbergs' argument, contained in their
Petition for Rehearing, that they should have been tried under the
treason clause, thereby receiving all of its procedural protections.
Although he acknowledged Professor Hurst's criticism that the Qui-
rin decision did not adequately consider that argument, Frank felt
bound by Quirin and held that the Rosenbergs had no right to be
tried under the treason clause since the elements of the two crimes
were not identical: "In the Quirin case, the absence of uniform was
an additional element, essential to Haupt's non-treason offense al-
though irrelevant to his treason; in the Rosenbergs' case, an essential
element of treason, giving aid to an 'enemy,' is irrelevant to the espi-
onage charge."
170
Consequently, the Rosenberg case is imperfect precedent for
permitting the death penalty in treason cases, since the cruel and
unusual claim was never analyzed by the Supreme Court. Further-
more, Judge Frank's inquiry is no longer appropriately premised
since the Court subsequently used the eighth amendment to void
statutes completely in such cases as Furman and Coker.
In 1957, Chief Justice Warren revived the eighth amendment in
Trop v. Dulles when he linked the "fundamental right" to United
States citizenship with the "dignity of man," which was "[t]he basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment .... ,,171 Warren
167. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 607 (1952).
168. Id at 608, n.33, quoting Resweber, 329 U.S. at 473: 'raking human life by unneces-
sarily cruel means shocks the most fundamental instincts of civilized man."
169. 195 F.2d at 609. Judge Frank agreed that taking a public opinion poll would not be
conclusive; he emphasized the findings of the trial judge and the discretion that all trial judges
have at the sentencing proceeding.
170. Id at 611.
171. 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1957). Since Trop was decided in 1957, the eighth amendment has
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struck down a Congressional statute permitting the State Depart-
ment to deny Trop a passport on the ground that he had lost his
citizenship as a result of being convicted and dishonorably dis-
charged for desertion during wartime.'72 The Chief Justice did not
hold that the penalty was so excessive as to violate Weems's propor-
tionality principle; he decided that, like torture, the penalty's nature
was impermissibly cruel. Warren dismissed the government's argu-
ment that Trop was fortunate since Trop could have been executed
for the same crime (and executions are not cruelper se):
At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the
constitutional limit on punishment. Whatever the arguments may be
against capital punishment, both on moral grounds, and in terms of
accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they are forceful-the
death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day
when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitu-
tional concept of cruelty. But it is equally plain that the existence of the
death penalty is not a license to the Government to devise any punish-
ment short of death within the limit of its imagination.
173
The Chief Justice also noted, without deciding, that the punishment
might also have been unusual since such a sanction had never been
proposed until 1940, and had never been litigated until Top. 174
3. Contemporary Cases
Despite the Supreme Court's history of reviewing death penalty
cases without condemning the penalty, and despite the damaging
statement in Trop that the penalty was not unconstitutionally cruel,
opponents began to directly attack the constitutionality of the death
gained importance. In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), in a dissent, Justice Frank-
furter accepted the concept of proportionality as a limitation on punishment: "Then, too, a cruelly
disproportionate relation between what the law requires and the sanction for its disobedience may
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual punishment, and, in re-
spect to the states, even offend the Due Process Clause of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment." Id at
231.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1961), is one of those marvelous cases the meaning of
which is so unclear that critics can argue about it forever--the Court held that California's convic-
tion of Robinson for drug addiction violated the eighth amendment. Robinson was limited by
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1967), which upheld a conviction for public drunkeness. However,
Robinson is relevant to this article since it holds that the eighth amendment applies to the states,
and consequently to any state treason trials.
172. 356 U.S. at 101.
173. Id at 99.
174. Id at 100-01 n.32.
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penalty. 175 After being briefed on the issue and hearing oral argu-
ment in Boykin v. Alabama, 76 the Court set aside Boykin's sen-
tence-not because the death penalty violated the eighth
amendment, but because Boykin's guilty plea was improperly ob-
tained. In MeGautha v. California,177 the Court was not persuaded
by the defendant's argument that the death penalty was a violation
of due process; the jury could have complete discretion in a
nonbifurcated processing to decide who should die.
Only a year after McGautha, Furman v. Georgia destroyed any
equilibrium about the death penalty's legal status. By giving the
judge and jury total discretion in deciding which convicted
criminals should die, the eighth amendment was violated. Justice
Stewart condemned such total discretion since executions were wan-
tonly and freakishly applied. 78 Justice Douglas believed that the
existing system fostered racial oppression because the penalty was
used more frequently against blacks than whites. 179 Justice Mar-
shall concluded that the death penalty was always unconstitutional
since there was no proof that it deterred crime; absent a deterrent
justification, retribution alone was insufficient. 80 Using Frank-
furter's and Warren's imagery, Justice Brennan believed that proof
of deterrence was irrelevant because the penalty violated the "basic
dignity of man," the underlying value contained within the eighth
amendment.' 8'
Because Furman only proscribed total discretion in death pen-
alty sentencing and did not reach the fundamental question of the
death penalty's constitutionality under any circumstances, the
175. Surprisingly, the first scholarly attack on the constitutionality of the death penalty
under any circumstances was in 1961. See Gottlieb, Testing the Death Penalty, 34 S. CAL. L. REV.
268 (1961). See also Goldberg and Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83
H v. L. REv. 1773 (1970), and Goldberg, The Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15 ARZ. L.
REv. 355 (1973).
176. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The constitutionality of executing rapists was first considered by
the Court in 1963, but certiorari was denied. Justice Goldberg wrote a vigorous dissent to the
denial, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889-91 (1963)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting). Goldberg's argument was condemned by Professor Packer; see Packer,
Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (1964). Goldberg pointed to
his dissent with pleasure after Coker later held that the death penalty was unconstitutionally dis-
proportionate; see Goldberg, The Death Penaltyfor Rape, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1978).
177. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
178. 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
179. Id at 250 (Douglas, J., concurring).
180. Id at 345-55 (Marshall, J., concurring).
181. Id at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court had to answer several intertwined questions in
Gregg v. Georgia 82 before allowing the state to execute Troy Leon
Gregg for murder. Only Justices Marshall and Brennan accepted
Gregg's threshold argument that the death penalty is a type of pun-
ishment completely outlawed by the eighth amendment.t 83 Writing
for a three judge plurality, Justice Stewart held that the death pen-
alty was a legitimate response to Gregg's crime since murder in-
volves the deliberate taking of life, and is consequently "the most
extreme of crimes."' 84 The other four justices, who agreed with
Stewart's conclusion, did not even discuss in their concurrences why
murderers could be killed; apparently they assumed, at least for
murder, that the death penalty must be permissible. Otherwise, they
would have been approving the penalty in theory, but precluding its
usual application, since the death penalty has primarily been used
against murderers.
Having decided that the death penalty was constitutional, at
least in murder cases, the Court then had to decide if the statute
properly determined which murderers should die. The statute pro-
vided that the jury must first find certain statutorily defined aggra-
vating circumstances, and then consider any mitigating
circumstances before sentencing Gregg to death. 85 According to
the Court, the jury no longer had the complete discretion con-
demned in Furman. Similar statutory systems in Texas and Florida
were also accepted the same day.1 86
In two other companion cases to Gregg, state legislatures had
182. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
183. Id at 227-31 (Brennan's dissent); id at 231-41 (Marshall's dissent).
184. Id at 187. The Stewart plurality accepted Weems' prohibition against excessive pun-
ishments because such punishments would violate the dignity of man. A penalty could be exces-
sive if the government wantonly inflicted pain or administered a grossly disproportionate penalty.
Id at 173. By refusing to be bound by either the early English or American interpretations of
cruel and unusual punishments, the plurality reaffirmed a commitment to a dynamic, evolutionary
reading of the eighth amendment. Id at 169, 173. Justice Rehnquist disliked the ambiguous
concept of "contemporary standards" being applied to the eighth and fourteenth amendments; he
argued that particularly in light of the historical use of the death penalty and the recent holding
supporting the penalty in McGautha, it was the Supreme Court that was acting freakishly. See
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 308-09 (1976).
185. 428 U.S. at 163.
186. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) and Proffltt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Proffitt
also limited the defendant's rights by holding that the trial judge could decide who can die, alleg-
edly because such decisions would be more consistent. 428 U.S. at 252. This entire system of
finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances was denounced by Professor Black. See Black,
Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. I (1976).
HeinOnline  -- 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 139 1983-1984
140 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
attempted to limit jury discretion by making the death penalty
mandatory once the defendant was convicted of certain crimes. The
Stewart plurality prohibited this approach because it camouflaged
discretion which would occur when juries simply refused to convict
otherwise doomed defendants, and because the system was too
crude: "Consideration of both the offender and the offense in order
to arrive at a just and appropriate sentence has been viewed as a
progressive and humanizing development."' 8 7 Thus, the jury had to
consider all mitigating factors, not just aggravating factors.18 8
Justice White dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist. White observed that some discretion was inevi-
table under any system; the limited discretion available to the jury
through its "raw power" of jury nullification was not equivalent to
the total jury discretion proscribed by Furman. 189 Mandatory death
penalties were as reasonable a means of limiting discretion as the
system of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upheld that
same day in Gregg, Jurek, and Proffitt.
a. Coker v. Georgia
In a typically multi-opinioned decision reflecting the divergent
views about the use of the death penalty, seven Justices held in
Coker v. Georgia 90 that the state of Georgia could not electrocute
Ehrlich Anthony Coker for rape. Writing for a four judge plurality
(consisting of Justices Blackmun, Stewart, Stevens, and himself),
Justice White adopted Gregg's definition of unconstitutionally ex-
cessive punishment: "[I]t (1) makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."' 19 Perhaps
because all four of these Justices had previously assumed in Gregg
that there was inadequate proof of the death penalty's nondeter-
rence or deterrence, they did not dwell upon the first prong of their
definition to determine if the penalty made no "measurable contri-
187. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976). The Woodson plurality upheld these unique procedures because the death penalty
was fundamentally different than any other punishment. 428 U.S. at 305.
188. 428 U.S. at 291.
189. Id at 306-07 (White, J., dissenting).
190. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
191. Id at 592. Weems and Trop did not provide any test to determine which punishments
were unconstitutionally excessive.
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bution." The plurality used two analytical techniques to decide that
the penalty was grossly disproportionate. First engaging in an "ob-
jective" test, they discussed how the states, other countries and juries
punished rapists.192 They observed that many jurisdictions did not
kill rapists. The plurality wished to demonstrate that their decision
was not based entirely upon bias, personal belief, and/or the second
test-the "subjective" test: "[I]n the end our own judgment wil be
brought to bear on the question .... 193 However, their "subjec-
tive" test was also not totally intuitive; they considered such external
factors as the crime's impact on the victim and on society.
The plurality's survey of punishments for rapists showed that
since Furman, (which had the effect of voiding all death penalty
statutes in 1972) only Georgia, North Carolina and Louisiana
passed new laws authorizing the death penalty for rapists, while six-
teen states had done so before Furman. (In the last fifty years, less
than half of the states had ever killed rapists).194 After the Supreme
Court had voided North Carolina's and Louisiana's mandatory cap-
ital punishment statutes for first degree murder and rape, those
states did not reinstate the death penalty for rape. Three other states
allowed executions only when the rapist was an adult and the victim
was a child, 195 and only three of sixty major countries still permitted
executions for rape when there was no murder. 96 After the Georgia
statute was modified in response to Furman, juries rarely used the
sanction, authorizing it at most in ten percent of rape convictions. 197
Shifting to the subjective test, the plurality compared the rela-
tive culpability of rape and murder by first assessing the injury to
the victim and the public, and then the moral depravity of the de-
192. Id
193. Id at 597.
194. Id at 593.
195. Id at 595. Subsequently the Florida Supreme Court held that the death penalty was an
unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment for the crime of sexually assaulting an eleven year
old child (whom the defendant also murdered). Buford v. Florida, 403 So. 2d 943 (1981). The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, Florida v. Buford, 102 S. Ct. 1037 (1982). Apparently, a traitor
must be shown to be more depraved and cause more injury than a child molester.
196. 433 U.S. at 596 n.10, citing United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Af-
fairs, Capital Punishment 40, 86 (1968).
197. 433 U.S. at 596-97. Six rapists had been sentenced to death by Georgia juries since the
law was passed in 1973. Sixty-three rape cases had been reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court.
Since many rape convictions had presumably not been appealed, at least when the defendant did
not receive the death sentence, the incidence of using capital punishment was probably less than
ten percent.
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fendant.198 The plurality felt that since murder is a final act for the
victim and the injuries are, by definition, beyond re~air, murder is a
far greater evil than rape, which may not include lasting physical
injury to the victim. Although the rapist is morally depraved, as
shown by the commission of a crime which "short of homicide,...
is the ultimate violation of self,"199 that depravity, even when com-
bined with a jury's required finding of an aggravating circumstance,
does not justify execution. The legal system would become cruelly
unfair if many non-murdering rapists died while many murderers
lived because the jury did not find any aggravating circumstances or
found adequate mitigating factors. The plurality concluded that the
penalty was grossly excessive and, thus, unconstitutional. In very
brief concurrences, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall accepted
the plurality's holding since it coincided with their continuing oppo-
sition to the use of the death penalty under any circumstances.
2°°
In his concurrence/dissent, Justice Powell maintained that the
death penalty was permissible when used against those appropri-
ately convicted of aggravated rape. Coker had not behaved so sav-
agely as to deserve death. Escaping from prison, where he was
serving time for rape and murder, Coker broke into a couple's
home, tied up the husband, and then raped the wife at knifepoint.
Although Coker told the husband he would kill the man's wife if the
police were contacted, Coker did not kill or harm her after he took
her hostage in the couple's car. A police officer testified at trial that
Coker had ample opportunity to injure the woman after the police
trapped Coker at the end of a dirt road; in addition, the record did
not indicate any proof of long-lasting psychological injury.
20 1 Pow-
ell concluded that the facts failed to show that "[p]etitioner's offense
was committed with excessive brutality or that the victim sustained
serious or lasting injury. ' 20 2 However, if the rape had been more
brutal, the death penalty would have been constitutionally accepta-
ble. Drawing a "bright line" between murder and rape, solely be-
cause of the death of the victim, was appealing, but excessively
198. Id at 597-98.
199. Id at 597.
200. Id at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring) (Marshall, J., concurring).
201. Petitionfor Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia, Coker v. Georgia, No.
75-5444, Oct. Term, 1975, at 16, in 97 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 685 (P. Kurkland and G. Casper eds.
1975).
202. 433 U.S. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
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reflected the plurality's personal beliefs. Powell concluded that "it
has not been shown that society finds the penalty disproportionate
for all rapists,"20 3 and that the plurality had not adequately consid-
ered that a rapist could be more culpable than a murderer. Yet any
penal statute can be defended under the theory that society has not
found the penalty disproportionate; a majority of the legislators
passed the law.
In his dissent, joined by Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger
accepted the plurality's two-pronged definition of excessiveness.
Burger attacked the plurality's "objective" and "subjective" applica-
tion of the second prong by arguing that the plurality rigidly im-
posed their own beliefs upon the elected legislative branches: "We
cannot know which among this range of possibilities [of forms of
punishment] is correct, but today's holding forecloses the very ex-
ploration we have said federalism was intended to foster."20 4 Bur-
ger also complained about the unnecessary breadth of the
decision-the prohibition of the use of the death penalty against all
rapists, not just Coker; the Chief Justice believed that Coker, a re-
cidivist previously convicted of murder, could constitutionally be
killed. The Chief Justice accepted the plurality's estimation of in-
flicted harm (aside from murder, rape is the "ultimate violation of
the self," causing long-term psychological damage to the victim and
her family), but found that level of injury sufficient justification for
capital punishment.2 5
Burger demonstrated the ambigious nature of the plurality's
objective data by showing how they myopically emphasized legisla-
tive behavior during the five years following Furman's voiding of all
existing capital punishment laws. Burger did not interpret the sub-
sequent reduced use of the death penalty against rapists as any clear
manifestation of legislative intent; he explained that the legislatures
might have been unsure of Furman's meaning. Furthermore, the
203. Id at 604.
204. Id at 617-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This argument was far more successful when it
was used to uphold the constitutionality of a forty-five year sentence for possession of less than
nine ounces of marijuana in Hutto v. Davis, 102 S. Ct. 703 (1982), and a life imprisonment sen-
tence for recidivism, based upon three relatively minor felonies in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263 (1980). The death penalty's irrevocable impact and incomparable injury to the defendant
justify a more rigorous application of the eighth amendment:
"[T]he imposition of death by public authority is... profoundly different from all other
penalties .... " Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
205. 433 U.S. at 612 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger was agreeing with Justice White's
characterization of the injury; the significance of that degree of injury was the central dispute.
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plurality ignored the frequent use of the death penalty against rap-
ists during the earlier part of the twentieth century (Burger did not
mention, however, that most of those who died were black
Southerners) .206
According to the Chief Justice, the plurality's subjective analy-
sis suffered from "primitive simplicity" by virtually establishing, as
constitutional law, the Biblical injunction of an eye for an eye, the
lex talionis. The legislature has a duty to protect its citizens from
"criminal activity which consistently poses serious danger of death
or grave bodily harm." 20 7 Rape is not a "minor crime;" the eighth
amendment should not shield rapists from the death penalty, but
should only protect minor criminals from death.20 8 Burger believed
that the Coker holding cast doubt on the constitutionality of all
criminal statutes authorizing the death penalty when no life has im-
mediately been taken, including treason, airplane hijacking and
kidnapping. 20 9
b. Lockett v. Ohio
In Lockett v. Ohio210 Chief Justice Burger set aside an Ohio
statute which so narrowly limited the sentencer's discretion that a
jury could not consider the following mitigating factors: Sandra
Lockett was sitting in a car as part of a robbery scheme while her
boyfriend went into a store and killed the owner; she did not intend
to have the owner killed; and she was not sufficiently culpable be-
cause of her character, prior record, and age. Burger concluded:
"The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that
degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more
important than in noncapital cases."' 211 Because of this procedural
defect, Burger did not consider Lockett's claim that the death pen-
alty was unconstitutionally disproportionate for one who has not
taken a life, attempted to take a life, or intended to take a life.21 2
206. Id at 614. Burger believes that the death penalty might have some deterrent effect,
particularly on someone like Coker, an escaped convict who, if he were to face life imprisonment
as the maximum sentence, has nothing more to lose if he is recaptured. Id at 617. At the very
least, Georgia's law should be given time to function so that data can be obtained to evaluate its
possible deterrent effect, since the entire question of deterrence is still unresolved. Id at 618.
207. Id at 620.
208. Id at 604.
209. Id at 621.
210. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
211. Id at 605.
212. Id at 609 n.16.
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c. Enmund v. Florida
Convicted of felony-murder under Florida law, Earl Enmund
was sentended to die for sitting in a getaway car while his two co-
horts engaged in a deadly shootout during the robbery of an elderly
couple. Since he neither took life, attempted to take life, nor in-
tended that any life be taken, Enmund claimed that his death sen-
tence was so disproportionate that it violated the fourteenth and
eighth amendments. 21 3 Enmund's disproportionality argument
forced the Court to consider not only the nature of the crime, but
also the relationship of the defendant to the crime-to determine if
the defendant was so "depraved" that death was appropriate.
Relying heavily on his Coker opinion, Justice White wrote the
plurality opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Black-
mun. White again engaged in an elaborate "objective" test, survey-
ing state laws, jury application of the death penalty in similar
circumstances and, as a new factor, the number of individuals pres-
ently sitting on death row who were sentenced for crimes similar to
Enmund's. White also inferred prosecutorial reluctance to seek the
death penalty in such cases because "[i]n only one case-En-
mund's-there was no finding of an intent to kill and the defendant
was not the triggerman." 214 White then applied the "subjective" test
by assessing Enmund's culpability; White agreed with H.L.A. Hart
that "causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely
than causing the same harm unintentionally."21:5 Furthermore, kill-
ing Enmund would not deter others like him since he had not
planned for the shootout to occur; fear of the death penalty would
probably only affect those who act deliberately. 216 Thus deterrence,
which White had not considered in Coker, became a factor.
Justice O'Connor's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, criticized the plurality for creating
an eighth amendment standard of intent, thereby interfering with
the states' power to assess guilt. The difficult question of assessing
degrees of culpability should be left under state law to the trier of
fact who must consider all mitigating factors, including the defend-
ant's intent.217 O'Connor concluded that the case should be re-
213. 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
214. I1d at 3376.
215. Id at 3377.
216. Id
217. Id at 3391 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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manded to the trial court for consideration of Enmund's less active
role in the killings as a possible mitigating factor.
O'Connor did not reject Coker's holding, its acceptance of pro-
portionality, or its use of objective data and subjective views to pro-
hibit the execution of rapists; 21 8 she believed that the plurality
misapplied the relevant data. Twenty-four states allowed the death
penalty in felony-murder cases, even though the defendant had
neither killed nor intended to kill anyone. To claim, as the plurality
did, that only nine states followed Florida's scheme, distorted the
motivation behind all the felony-murder capital statutes to punish
those who significantly participate in a lethal crime.
219
IV. DOES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT REALLY MEAN
ANYTHING?: PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
PUNISHMENT AND PROPORTIONAL PUNISHMENT
After reviewing the eighth amendment cases decided by the
Supreme Court, one may be inclined to agree with the two members
of the First Congress who said that the amendment is "too indefi-
nite," having "no meaning in it." ' 220 Can this language help us de-
cide if traitors should die? The adjectives "cruel and unusual"
actually provide some emotional reaction and analytical direction,
even if they fail to clarify whether the amendment was intended to
prohibit only certain types of punishments, or also to outlaw exces-
sive application of otherwise acceptable punishments. 2
21
Because death is a permissible weapon against murderers, the
convicted traitor cannot argue that the death penalty is a form of
punishment which, like torture, is cruelper se. The defendant must
argue that the government's motives and justifications are (or fre-
quently can be) cruel, and/or claim that those justifications are in-
sufficient, thereby making the penalty grossly excessive. Moral
philosophy has long wrestled with both issues-justifications of
punishment and proportionality-and can help one appreciate the
issues' complexity; numerous assumptions must be made, even
though there may be no answers beyond leaps of faith concerning
218. Id at 3391.
219. Id at 3390.
220. 1 ANNALS, supra note 139, at 382-83.
221. One reason for the confusion over the use of the two contrasting techniques to deter-
mine which punishments are "cruel," is that the techniques are based upon the same premise of
stopping disproportionate punishments. Some penalties are always disproportionate, while others
are disproportionate for some crimes but acceptable for others.
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man's proper relationship to man.222
Since the phrase "cruel and unusual" does not explicitly limit
the justifications one can use in support of a given punishment, the
vague clause becomes a vehicle through which advocates can assert
any conceivable goal of criminal law.223 How is one to determine
which justifications are so "rational" that they are not cruel: permit-
ting such goals as deterrence while proscribing such motivations as
punishing only (or perhaps partially) for the pleasure of making an-
other suffer? "Rationality" must have a moral perspective if sadism
is to be excluded. And once acceptable reasons for punishment
have been agreed upon, how is one to determine which punishments
are acceptable for which crimes?
Most philosophers considering justifications for punishment
have narrowed the issue of permissible purposes by evaluating two
competing schools of thought, utilitarianism (teleological) and re-
tributivism. Accepting the legitimacy of one of the two theories (or
some combination) may not beg the question; philosopher Joel
Feinberg claims that if one first defines utilitarianism fairly pre-
cisely, and then defines retributivism as utilitarianism's logical con-
tradictory, the "two theories are not only mutually exclusive but
jointly exhaustive as well." 224 Yet difficulties abound in creating a
fairly precise definition of utilitarianism; comparing pleasures and
pains to determine if a given action will create more pleasure than
222. This article is a testimony to such premises, which were formed during the author's
adolescence. Not only did Albert Camus provide reasons for living, but Camus also provided the
intellectual links which triggered this article's birth. I was reading some unremembered article
discussing the limits of governmental power and it triggered a word association with Camus's
theory of limits, which specifically condemned the killing of men and women for political goals. It
was then a matter of studying the cases. See generally A. CAMus, THE REBEL (A. Bower trans.
1957). For another example of existential legal scholarship, see Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatu-
ral Law, 1979 DUKE LJ. 1229 (1979).
223. There are limits to arguments that can be made about the meaning of the eighth
amendment:
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause does invite the person interpreting it to free-
lance to a degree, but the freelancing is bounded. The subject is punishments, not the
entire range of government action, and even in that limited area the delegation to the
interpreter is not entirely unguided; only those punishments that are in some way serious
("cruel") and susceptible to sporadic imposition ("unusual") are to be disallowed.
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14 (1980).
224. J. FEINBERG, Punishment, in PUNISHMENT 2 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as PUNISH-
MENT]. See also Ellis, Commentary; Constitutional Law: The Death Penalty: .4 Critique of the
Philosophical hases Held to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment Requirements for its Justification, 34
OKLA. L. REV. 567 (1981) and Gardner, CapitalPunishment: The Philosophers and the Court, 29
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1175 (1978).
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pain for a person necessitates reducing that person's pleasures and
pains to some common denominator. Even if such a denominator
can be agreed upon, and even if one concedes that interpersonal
comparisons of utility can then be made 225 (based upon either the
previously defined internal system or some other external common
denominator), a choice must be made between an ever-growing
number of theories of utilitarianism, all of which apply costs and
benefits differently. For instance, Professor Donald Regan com-
bines elements of act-utilitarianism, which emphasizes the costs and
benefits of a single action, with rule-utilitarianism, which assesses
the costs and benefits of generalized application of a given policy, to
create "co-operative utilitarianism. '226
Retributivism does not have the gloss of efficiency, of applying
cost-benefit ratios, which makes utilitiarianism initially appear more
objective. The retributivists state that a criminal should be pun-
ished if, and only if, the criminal deserves the punishment because
he is guilty. Immanuel Kant formulated a classic hypothetical that
dramatizes the retributivists' viewpoint. Assume that someone com-
mitted a murder on an island and was caught, but after the arrest
everyone living there decided to leave and separate when they
reached the mainland. According to Kant, the islanders would still
be morally bound to punish the murderer even if the pain of the
punishment outweighed any practical effects, which would be mini-
mal since the society would no longer exist. The right of equal retal-
iation, the lex talionis, is one of justice's fundamental categorical
imperatives. Reliance upon utilitarianism, which is willing to sacri-
fice an individual for the benefit of community, would result in the
destruction of justice.227 Philosopher H.J. McCloskey elaborates:
225. See L. ROBBINS, ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE, ch. 6
(1932) and I. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS, chs. 4-6 (1957). Bruce Ackerman
believes that one can conceivably make such impartial comparisons. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 45 (1980) for an interesting discussion of utilitarianism.
226. D. REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION (1980). Regan's sophisticated de-
fense of his theory is intimidating, both because of its erudition and because of its numerous
assumptions about human nature. A judge would be making many unknown assumptions if he
declares he is or is not a utilitarian.
227. I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, PART II, 194-98 (W. Hastie trans. 1887). Hegel
goes further, arguing that the criminal has a right to be punished:
Further, what is involved in the action of the criminal is not only the concept of the
crime, the rational aspect present in crime as such whether the individual wills it or not,
the aspect which the state has to vindicate, but also the abstract rationality of the individ-
ual's volition. Since that is so, punishment is regarded as containing the criminal's right
and hence by being punished he is honored as a rational being.
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"The real quarrel between the retributivists and the utilitarian is
whether a system of inflictions of suffering on people without refer-
ence to the gravity of their offenses or even to whether they have
committed offenses, is just and morally permissible." 228
More sophisticated utilitarian theories have attempted to refute
Kant's criticisms; a rule-utilitarian might claim that systematically
punishing such murderers could be justified to make the islanders
better citizens on the mainland or to deter future criminals who
would be deterred because they could not hope that later societal
disintegration would protect them. Kant's retributivism could even
be characterized as a form of long-run utilitarianism since he con-
demned utilitarianism for its detrimental effects: "For if justice and
righteousness perish, human life would no longer have any value in
the world."229
Thus, depending upon one's definitions of "utility" and "de-
sert," utilitaranism and retributivism can use different analytical
techniques to achieve identical systems of punishment. Every the-
ory of punishment has utilitarian characteristics; each theory seeks
to maximize its notion of "the Good." Kant could justify the death
penalty as a punishment for murder under his theory of equal retali-
ation, while a utilitarian might approve of the sanction because of
its alleged deterrent effects. Kant would easily condemn the punish-
ment of a person known to be innocent since the punishment was
not deserved, while John Rawls believes that the practice of telish-
ment-systematically punishing people known to be innocent-
would be counterproductive by alienating the citizenry, who would
G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 100 (T. Knox trans. 1969). See also B. AUNE, KANT'S
THEORY OF MORALS 160-69 (1979).
228. McCloskey, .4 Non- Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES ON PUNISHMENT 123 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1977).
229. I. KANT, supra note 227, at 195-96. H.L.A. Hart believes that all such theories that
conclude that the use of punishment is of value whenever there has been a crime involving guilt,
are really disguised utilitarian theories. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 8-9
(1968). Indeed, as Professor Joel Finer said to me, it is hard to think of any moral philosophy of
punishment that does not base its theory upon some optimization of some predefined "good." If
one substitutes that "good" for Bentham's "happiness," most philosophical analysis appears
utilitarian.
I. The end of law is, to augment happiness.
Ii. But punishment is an evil. But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is
evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil. (Bentham's emphasis).
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, ch. 13, sec. 1
(WV. Harrison ed. 1948).
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not know why a person was punished, how to feel about that person,
and what behavior was reprehensible. Such doubts would diminish
community loyalty.230
Rawls tries to resolve the tension by combining the two theo-
ries. Utilitarian considerations should be used exclusively to deter-
mine which acts deserve which punishments, while retribution
requires that only those found guilty should actually be punished.
Utility limits the ambiguous, powerful urge to give the criminal
what he deserves, while retribution guarantees that punishment is
limited to those who have actually committed a crime, as deter-
mined by the legal system to the best of its ability.23' H.L.A. Hart
finds utilitarianism useful to fix the maximum amount of punish-
ment that can be given someone, but uses other moral principles-
such as not punishing the innocent-to complete a system of just
punishment.23
2
The appropriate level of punishment-proportionality-has
been another major issue that each camp has used to discredit the
other. Retributivists argue that the concept of equal retaliation lim-
its the amount of punishment a criminal deserves. To give the crim-
inal more punishment than he merits would violate his continuing
right to be treated as an equal person, not as a means. It would be
unjust to execute someone for jaywalking even if it could be shown
that more lives would be saved since other jaywalkers would be de-
terred. Equality of retaliation is not identity of retaliation, which
could be either too mild or too severe. To rape a rapist or burn
down an arson's house might be considered equal retaliation, but
nobody deserves such punishment; a just state must not stoop to the
techniques of its most savage members. To punish a thief by assess-
ing a fine only for the cost of the goods stolen would be insufficient;
theft is a serious offense, infficting harm exceeding the amount
taken. Such analysis is somewhat conclusory; retributivist philoso-
pher H.J. McCloskey concedes that determining the relative gravity
of offenses is difficult under any system, including utilitarianism; the
best method is "to look at the nature of the offense. ' '
233
230. Rawls, Two Concepts ofRules, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 91
(G. Ezorsky ed. 1977).
231. Id at 84.
232. H.L.A. HART, supra note 229, at 80. W.D. Ross sees the primary justification for pun-
ishment to be the promise to the victim and society that criminals will be punished. See W.D.
Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 64 (1965).
233. McCloskey, supra note 228, at 134.
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To the utilitarian charge that such vague words as "dessert,"
"equality" and "retribution" are fancy words for revenge, retribu-
tivists have two responses. They either deny such an allegation,
claiming that retribution is society's reaction while revenge is per-
sonal, or they agree that punishment is partially and appropriately
motivated by revenge, a legitimate part of the criminal justice sys-
tem so long as it does not overwhelm the continuing rights of the
criminal to be treated as a person and receive only punishment
equal to his crime.23
4
Utilitarians believe that their system provides a much more
concrete technique for comparing crimes and assessing appropriate
punishments. Jaywalkers should not be executed because the popu-
lace would be horrified and intimidated; because no one would be
convicted by a jury; because people would feel sorry for jaywalkers;
and/or because many more jaywalkers might be executed than lives
saved through reduced accidents. Jaywalking creates very little pain
and does provide the pleasure of convenience; therefore, to inflict
such pain upon someone who has committed such a negligible in-
jury would create an imbalance of pain and pleasure. Fining a thief
for the amount taken would not deter thieves, while raping rapists
would dehumanize everyone involved. Yet those arguments reaf-
firm McCloskey's point that utilitarian definitions of pains and
pleasures are uncertain, similar to ambiguities affecting retributivist
rankings of culpability based upon the gravity of the offense. -Utili-
tarians must rebut the argument that the only way they can con-
demn public torture, assuming proof exists that the pleasure for the
masses (including deterrence) outweighs the individual suffering, is
to incorporate personal, non-utilitarian values into their cost-benefit
analysis.235
234. E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 10-14 (1975). Van den Haag cites approv-
ingly James Fitzjames Stephens's famous aphorism: "The criminal law stands to the passion of
revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite." Stephens elaborated:
"[O]fie of the arguments in favor of exemplary punishments (death, flogging, and the like) is that
they emphatically justify and gratify the public desire for vengeance upon such offenders." 2 J.
STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 80 (1863).
235. Bruce Ackerman wonders if utilitarian arguments against slavery really reflect personal
opposition to slavery.
I feel very certain that the ideal observer would find the liberal state happier than the
slave society, even after full allowance is made for the peculiar miseries suffered by some
in the liberal condition. Yet, as soon as I make this judgment, doubts begin to form: the
convergence between my own personal views and those of the ideal observer strikes me
as downright suspicious.
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As if the issues were not already complex, A.J. Ayer throws a
monkey wrench into the debate by asserting that both retributivism,
which is based upon "dessert," and utilitarianism, which errone-
ously equates "pleasure" with "good," 236 are literally senseless tau-
tologies that may appear to be somewhat empirical but actually are
personal expressions of value. Ayer maintains that one can have
reasoned debates only over the facts surrounding any proposed ac-
tion, such as probable effects, the actors' motives and special cir-
cumstances. These facts may lead to different conclusions under
different moral philosophies, but the subsequent step of evaluating
the competing moral philosophies is logically impossible:
Given that a man has certain moral principles, we argue that he must,
in order to be consistent, react morally to certain things in a certain
way. What we do not and cannot argue about is the validity of these
moral principles. We merely praise or condemn in light of our own
feelings.
237
Applying Ayer's analysis to treason, one should first determine
what might happen if traitors are or are not executed. Those predic-
tions may not be completely verifiable, given the limitations of psy-
chology and the vagaries of history, but such imprecision does not
make the predictions of effects logically invalid in the same sense
that Ayer claims retributivism and utilitarianism are meaningless.
Once all the possible effects are considered, feelings control. Ayer's
analysis does not prevent evaluation of many effects that are consid-
ered utilitarian benefits or costs: executing a traitor will prevent that
person from committing treason again. Yet characterizing preven-
tion of recidivism as a utilitarian benefit obscures the emotional bias
underlying utilitarian analysis. The effects usually labelled utilita-
rian benefits constitute an emotionally reassuring group: specific
deterrence of potential criminals, general deterrence of the popula-
B. ACKERMAN, supra note 225, at 328. Sprigge's utilitarian reply to McCloskey virtually admits
that there are other emotional values that affect the theories of punishment.
First, a man who was not sad at producing suffering would lack the basic sentiment
which inspires the utility principle, namely a revulsion at the suffering and a delight in
the happiness of any sentient being. Second, sentiments such as the love of justice, re-
spect for human life and so on, are sentiments which utilitarian considerations bid us
cherish in ourselves and others.
T.L.S. Sprigge, A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUN-
ISHMENT at 74 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1977).
236. A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 104-05 (1952). Ayer's theory has been fre-
quently attacked. See R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORAS 9-31 (1964).
237. Id at 111-12.
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tion,238 education of the populace, expression of community out-
rage,239 incarceration or obliteration of the offender so he can do no
more harm, rehabilitation, 240 and perhaps expiation. Another ar-
guably desirable consequence, never acknowledged by the Supreme
Court, is particularly relevant to this article: the perpetuation and
legitimation of the existing government through intimidation and
the satisfaction of the citizenry attained by destroying perceived
enemies.241
Even if the Supreme Court were to accept Ayer's thesis that
competing moral philosophies can only be evaluated through feel-
ings, that there is no logical way to prove that Hitler was morally
inferior to Albert Schweitzer, the Court would still turn to tradi-
tional moral philosophy for guidance. The Court must ground its
interpretation of the eighth amendment upon some theory or theo-
ries of punishment in terms that society can understand and evalu-
ate, so that all of us can assess both the quality of the Court's
feelings and the internal consistency of the application of those feel-
ings to varying facts.242 Utilitarian and retributivist systems both
serve this purpose since they incorporate numerous assumptions
about human nature, "rationality," "consistency," behavior and re-
lationships that are consistent with modern American beliefs (very
few theorists support torture). Both systems force the reader (or the
Justice) to test his or her feelings by considering issues that each
238. For a summary of the various justifications for punishment, see Gardiner, The Purposes
of Criminal Punishment, 21 MOD. L. REV. 117 (1958).
239. See J. FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING 95
(1970).
240. Plato applauded the rehabilitative goal: "A just penalty disciplines us and makes us
more just and cures us of evil." PLATO, Gorgias, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 262
(E. Hamilton and H. Cairns eds. 1961). The rehabilitative ideal, not relevant to those supporting
the death penalty (except that those who were not killed might be so grateful that they would be
more easily rehabilitated), has declined in influence. See Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and
the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, AND POL. ScI. 226 (1959), and Allen, The
Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal in American Criminal Justice, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147 (1978).
241. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 266 (1950). Joel Feinberg believes that Hobbes's views
represent a third school of thought-the vindictive theory of punishment-which anthropologists
have traced back to forms of tribal morality. FEINBERG, supra note 224, at 8. Since treason is
such a direct threat to community solidarity, the community's response can be uniquely vindictive:
"Societies, it has been cleverly argued by Rene Girard, are founded in blood. The ruling class
pursues the same game and is united in the sacrifice of the same animal, and the consumption of
its flesh. Girard claims that the first sacrifice was always that of a human scapegoat. Those who
kill together, pray together, he claims." Raphael, Dirty Tricks are the Tricks We Haven't Thought
Of, in THE LISTENER 13 (Nov. 18, 1982).
242. AYER, supra note 236, at 111.
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camp emphasizes and problems that each side claims cripple the
other. Philosophical analysis, like legal analysis, can sometimes
change feelings and positions by demonstrating to a decision maker
that implementing those initial views can lead to results that would
violate more powerful emotions.
As has been the case in legal history and scholarship, the
Supreme Court's application of jurisprudence has been ad hoc. A
typical example is Justice White's use in Enmund of H.L.A. Hart's
theory that unintentional acts are less culpable than intentional
acts.243 Perhaps this lack of philosophical rigor is justified. A Jus-
tice's commitment to a philosophical theory, be it rule-utilarianism
or Kant's categorical imperative of retribution, would force that Jus-
tice into erudite analysis and into making many assumptions that
could bind the Justice far more than precedent. Furthermore, the
jurisprudence of punishment raises more questions than it answers;
since none of the philosophies seem to be self-evidently dominant,
one should be wary of attacking the Justices for acting somewhat
intuitively. The moral philosophers' attempts to rank crimes seem
to be as conclusory as the Justices' attempts.
The Court's unanimous acceptance of deterrence and other
practical goals under the term "utilitarian," and their acceptance of
retribution (with the exception of Justice Marshall),244 reflect many
unarticulated values and resolutions of basic issues. Wanton sadism
is not acceptable; that emotional conclusion is a crucial premise in
deciding which punishments are "wrong." Using the criminal jus-
tice system solely to keep oneself in power is another illegitimate
justification. Even if the Court does state its numerous premises
more clearly, critics will challenge the transitions, via the "reason-
ing" process, from the basic premises---"dignity of man," for exam-
ple-to evaluation of specific penalties for specific crimes.
All of this intellectual conflict and ambiguity does not provide
any easy way to decide if traitors deserve to die, or if the costs out-
weigh the benefits in killing traitors. Virtually any punishment, in-
cluding torture, can be defended for its alleged deterrent effect or
because the criminal "deserved" the punishment. Unless the Court
prefers to defer totally to the legislature, thereby gutting the eighth
amendment, it must somehow draw lines. Even Rehnquist, the Jus-
tice most deferential to the legislature in eighth amendment cases,
243. 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
244. Furman, 408 U.S. at 345.
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would probably rely on the framers' views to prohibit drawing and
quartering.245 The next section shall explore how each of the Jus-
tices might resolve a capital treason case in a manner consistent with
his or her prior opinions.
V. DECIDING How To DECIDE
Both to evaluate their previous decisions and to make some
predictions as to what arguments might be persuasive, this section is
written under the assumption that each of the nine Justices would
evaluate a capital treason case similarly to the way they decided
Gregg, Coker, and Enmund. This apparently straightforward ap-
proach is imperfect; although all of the Justices would consider vir-
tually any and all of the information and arguments gathered in this
article's descriptive section-historical episodes, legal precedents,
the framers' thoughts about the Constitution, and philosophical jus-
tifications for punishment-one cannot know which factors would
be controlling, particularly since treason is a significantly different
crime from murder or rape. Further complications arise because the
Justices have not completely exposed their conscious decision-mak-
ing process, either because they prefer to maintain the image of not
imposing their own political views, or because they do not want to
commit themselves to a position until a case forces them to do so.
246
Finally, legal scholars have published hundreds of articles on the
death penalty and on judicial review, creating a multitude of argu-
ments, challenging each other, criticizing the Justices' various deci-
sions, and modifying their positions as the debate continues.
247
Certain Justices, however, may be persuaded if an advocate can cite
eminent scholars for support. For example, I shall apply Professor
Charles Black's opposition to the death penalty, which is based
upon the inevitability of caprice and mistake, to capital treason
cases.
245. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 308-09.
246. For an approach using literary analysis to reveal how judges can obfuscate, see Weis-
berg, How Judges Speak Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd Sailor With an Application
to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1 (1982).
247. Two recent law review symposia provide an ample introduction to the competing theo-
ries of judicial review. See generally Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981) and Symposium: JudicialReview Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1981).
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A. Applying Justice WTite's "Objective" and "Subjective" Tests to
a Capital Treason Case
Justice White proscribed the death penalty for rape under the
second prong of his definition of "excessive punishment" which dis-
allows any punishment that "is grossly out of proportion to the se-
verity of the crime."248 White never used the first prong of his test to
make a determination of the death penalty's "measurable contribu-
tion;" White's approach may have resulted from his prior accept-
ance of the death penalty against murderers in Gregg. Even less
data existed on the possible deterrent effect of the death penalty on
rape than on murder. If White claimed that such lack of proof
meant there was no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals
of punishment, he arguably would have been contradicting his pre-
vious acceptance of inconclusive data in Gregg.
White reduced this definition to an objective test-the study of
how various jurisdictions have punished rapists to help determine
the "evolving standards of decency"; and a "subjective" test-the
plurality's personal reactions to killing rapists. The heated debate in
Coker and Enmund over the significance of the objective data
would continue in a treason case. Only eight people have been exe-
cuted for any political crimes since 1930-the two Rosenbergs and
six of the eight German saboteurs who landed in Florida during
World War 11.249 (One could possibly include the shooting of Pri-
vate Slovik for desertion.) Nobody has been executed for treason
since John Brown in 1859, and nobody is currently sentenced to
death for the crime. White might conclude that juries and prosecu-
tors are not eager to kill political criminals. Such infrequent use of
the penalty for political crimes could be interpreted as society's
evolving distate for the penalty, at least against political criminals.
Legislative treatment of treason has been uneven. In 1955,
twenty-one states permitted the use of the death penalty in treason
cases.250 In 1982, thirteen states and the federal government still
retained the death penalty for treason,251 while sixteen other states
248. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
249. W. BOWERS, ExEcUTIONS IN AMERICA 54, n.g (1974).
250. Bedau, Offenses Punishable by Death, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 43 (H.
Bedau, ed.) (1967).
251. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2381 (West. Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3942 (1976); CAL. ANN.
PENAL CODE § 37 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-11-101 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. 17-10-30
(1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 30-1 (Smith-Hurd 1966); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-113 (West
1974); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-7-67 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 576,070 (Vernon 1979); NEV. REV.
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have authorized only prison sentences for the crime.252 Another six-
teen states define the crime of treason in their constitutions but do
not provide any specific penalty for the crime. 253 Four states do not
define the crime under either their constitutions or their statutes.
254
Hawaii is the only state to make no reference to the crime. Cer-
tainly these laws do not demonstrate any more legislative support
for the death penalty than existed in Enmund.
No studies exist on jury decisions sentencing traitors to death in
comparison to those where traitors receive lesser sentences. The
Court will always have little data when the death penalty is being
applied to crimes aside from murder, if only because the penalty
was not previously being used. The Enmund plurality's use of data
STAT. § 196.010 (1981) (10 year to life sentence); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 25-7-30, 25-7-40 (Law Co-op
1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 3401 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.82.010 (1977).
Two states, New Hampshire and Nebraska, (not included in the list of twelve states above)
refer in their State Code Indexes to the U.S. Constitution, art. 3, § 3 ch. 2, to establish the proper
penalty. The U.S. Constitution provides that Congress should set the penalty for treason, and
Congress has authorized the death penalty. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2381. Whether this Congressional pen-
alty would be legally applicable to treason against a state is unclear. See NEB. REv. STAT. Index
(1908); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. Index (1976).
South Carolina's law is unique, for it only authorizes the death penalty in time of "war."
Also, the South Carolina statute defines treason to include only giving information to or gathering
information for an enemy. The statute is different from the South Carolina Constitution, which
only outlaws "levying war against it [the state], adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and
comfort." S.C. CONST. art. I § 17. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 25-7-30, 25-7-40 (Law Co-op 1976).
252. Of the 16 states that exclusively authorize prison sentences, 12 authorize life imprison-
ment for treason. ALA. CODE § 13-11-2 (1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3801 (1981); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 264 § 1.2 (Michie/Law Co-op 1966); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750-544 (West 1971);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.385 (West 1947); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1266 (West 1972); OR. Rav.
STAT. § 166.005 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-43-1 (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-8-1
(1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-481 (1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-1-1, 61-12 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 946.01 (West 1982).
Three states authorize shorter prison sentences. Tennessee punishes treason with a ten to
twenty year sentence, Florida, one to thirty year sentence and North Dakota, one to twenty year
sentence. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.32 (West 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-07-01 (1971) (repealed
1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4402, 39-4403 (1975).
New Hampshire does not have a treason statute, but its subversive advocacy statute is some-
what similar. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 648:2 (1976).
253. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 10; ARIZ. CONsT. art. II, § 28; CONN. CONST. art. IX, § 4; DEL.
CONST. art. VI, § 3; IDAHO CONsT. art. V, § 5; IND. CONsT. art. I, § 28; IOWA CONsT. art. I, § 16;
KY. CONST. § 229; ME. CONST. art. I, § 12; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 30; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 17;
N.M. CONST. art. II. § 16; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 29; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 22; UTAH CONsT. art. I,
§ 19; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 26.
254. Some references to treason are made in the constitutions or statutes of Ohio, Nebraska,
Pennsylvania, New York, and Maryland, but no definition of the crime of treason against the state
is found. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 11; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 18; contra Mo. CONST. B. of R. art. I, § 30.
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puts the government in a bind whenever it wants to extend the death
penalty; any extension will be for the "first time," and can be char-
acterized as unrepresentative prosecutional behaviour. The defend-
ant can also claim that there was far more active use of executions
against rapists than against any other criminals except murderers,
but that even that level of use was not sufficient "objective" support.
Judge Frank observed in Rosenberg that public opinion polls
are not very helpful in determining attitudes that change with the
political climate.255 A poll taken in Minnesota in May, 1973, after
Furman, indicated that thirty-nine percent of those surveyed fa-
vored "automatic" capital punishment for "crime against the federal
government such as treason, sabotage and espionage." 256 In a sur-
vey taken to rank the seriousness of a crime by asking what penalty
offenders should receive, spying was considered the thirteenth worst
crime out of eighteen-worse than mugging but not as bad as a poli-
tician's accepting bribes.257 While a defendant could argue that this
low percentage and low ranking indicate lack of support for the
death penalty, support for capital punishment would probably in-
crease during a war or insurrection.
Unlike rape, treason and similar political crimes are still pun-
ishable by death in many other countries. The United Nations re-
port, cited in Coker, stated that it is lawful in fifty-three countries to
kill those convicted of treason and other political crimes.258 The
Court can accept severe punishments, perhaps including torture, if it
looks to other governments to determine evolving standards of de-
cency in punishing political criminals. For example, in 1982, Polish
authorities indicted four leaders of a dissident intellectual group,
KOR, for trying to overthrow the state by force, a crime punishable
by death.259
Even if a consensus could be reached on the meaning of the
objective data, conflict would reappear over the subjective compari-
sons of murder, rape, and treason-in terms of the acts themselves
255. See supra note 169.
256. Vidmar and Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 129 (H. Bedau ed. 1975).
257. Hamilton and Rotkin, Interpreting the Eighth Amendment: Perceived Seriousness of
Crime and Severity of Punishment, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 516 (H.
Bedau ed. 1975).
258. U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, U.N. Sales
No. 62, IV, 2 (1962).
259. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1982, § 1, at 3, col 5.
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and the depravity of the actors. In Coker, the plurality only consid-
ered harm to the victim and harm to the public to determine the
degree of moral depravity. The Enmund plurality emphasized the
defendant's personal culpability: "Enmund did not kill or intend to
kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the rob-
bers who killed; yet the state treated them alike and attributed to
Enmund the culpability of those who killed the Kerseys." 260
How does treason fit into these two hierarchies ranking the
crime and ranking the criminal's depravity? There are a number of
competing schemes: (1) treason could be considered worse than
murder or rape; (2) treason could be seen as not as venal as either
rape or murder; (3) treason could be equated with either rape or
murder; (4) treason could be viewed as less heinous than murder but
more so than rape; (5) treason could be considered so different from
rape or murder that comparisons would only be misleading; or (6)
treason encompasses so many activities that it may fall into any of
the five previous rankings. According to McCloskey, there is no
self-evident answer to determine which ranking is appropriate,
much less which one is constitutionally required:
We do disagree, and most of us would have doubts about the right
order of the gravity of crimes. This shows very little. We have the
same doubts-and disagreements-in other areas of morality where we
are uncertain about which duties are most stringent and where we differ
from others in our ordering of duties.261
Even once we have agreed that there is an "ought," in terms of con-
demning certain behaviors, this particular transition from "is" to
"ought" is complicated tremendously by comparisons.
By emphasizing the victim's injury, the Coker plurality may
have consciously been avoiding evaluation of political crimes:
"Short of homicide, it [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self.'" The
"public injury," which was defined as the "undermining of the com-
munity's sense of security, ' 262 was not so grave. In treason, how-
ever, the injury could be characterized as the "ultimate violation of
community security."
Applying philosopher Joel Feinberg's thesis that a major pur-
pose of punishment is to express community outrage,263 a supporter
260. 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
261. McCloskey, supra note 228, at 134.
262. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-98.
263. J. FEINBERG, supra note 239.
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of the penalty can claim that since treason may ultimately destroy a
government, and thus a community, the community should be able
to express its anger and fear against this heinous crime by using the
ultimate penalty, especially since the death penalty has been pre-
served for the lesser crime of murder. The execution of traitors can
unify the community by eliminating more deviant members. Even
someone initially opposed to the death penalty might agree that
once the sanction is allowed against murderers, society can fairly
use it against traitors. Under Richard Posner's economic imagery,
the community sets a price on crimes by the penalty,264 and the price
for murder and treason should at least be the same. Furthermore,
one argument against killing criminals such as rapists or kidnap-
pers-that they will be pressured into killing their victim so there
will be no adverse witness-does not apply to most traitors since the
crime is usually unobserved and there is no particular victim who is
directly and immediately affected.
In support of the argument that treason will usually cause less
injury, the defendant can contrast the widespread harm that might
be caused by treason to the total, individual harm caused by mur-
der. Feinberg believes that murder inflicts the most injury and vio-
lates the most interests because it destroys the "supreme welfare
interest" one has in life, a vital precondition to enjoyment of all
other rights.265 When no deaths can be attributed to the treason, the
severity of the harm is harder to assess. When antitrust violations or
the sale (with knowledge) of faulty products occur, for instance,
there are widespread violations of the public's rights, which cause
more total injury than a single theft or a single murder. Neverthe-
less, courts do not punish those who commit such crimes as severely.
The greatest sanctions in criminal law are usually reserved for per-
sonal injuries. Murder is a unique crime, deserving a unique pun-
ishment, because the defendant took the life of another. The
murderer cannot claim that the state is doing something to him that
he would never do to anyone; he arguably has waived any contrac-
tual right266 to continued life since he took a life. Of course, every
264. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972).
265. FEINBERG, Harm and Self Interest, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY
60 (1980).
266. Retreating behind John Rawis's "veil of ignorance" does not help much, partially be-
cause punishment is rarely discussed in his classic work, A THEORY OF JUSTICE. Al of the negoti-
ators might agree that murder is an obvious evil which can be punishable by death, while the
unclear meaning of treason creates too great a possibility of misuse or error. On the other hand,
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crime breaches the relationship between the criminal and society,
and the government could reply that treason represents a more total
rejection of the society than murder.
There are practical reasons to draw a bright line for the death
penalty at murder. Courts would not have to face perpetual case-
by-case determinations which would inevitably result in uneven ap-
plication- Nor would some traitors die while some convicted mur-
derers live. The Court could justify this limitation under the
principle of a life for a life. Such a standard would be more of a
"neutral principle" 267 than most others, such as Chief Justice Bur-
ger's "life endangering" and "grievous affronts to humanity" stan-
dards, which allow continued discretion, arbitrary application and
the balancing of the defendant's life against any number of factors.
Reliance upon the valid concern for community security to justify
executing traitors allows the state's power to expand in many unpre-
dictable, dangerous directions. Certain traitors may cause more
harm than most murderers, but it will be very difficult to make that
determination, particularly when nobody has died.
It is also harder to determine the "depravity" of a traitor than
of a murderer. Unlike treason, everyone knows what murder is and
there is a consensus against murder. "Treason," however, may be
the act of a patriot; this country was founded as a result of a collec-
tive act of treason. Philosopher W.D. Ross claims that the state is
not the equivalent of the community; therefore, supporting the state
can be treason to the community. 268 Thus, the state should not be
the negotiators might conclude that treason represents the greatest threat to the effective imple-
mentation of their agreement, the most total repudiation of their contract and of any rights it
guarantees. See generally J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter referred to as
THEORY]. Robert Nozick's emerging libertarians could react either way; they may conclude that
the process of determining traitors is so unreliable that convicted traitors should not be killed. R.
NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 96 (1974). Certainly Nozick would oppose treason
against the "State"; someone would have to be victimized so that they were owed the duty by the
state to punish the victimizer. Id at 136-37. Nevertheless, all parties might originally agree to
join the dominant protective agency in part because it would kill anyone who tried to destroy it.
For a more elaborate extrapolation of Rawls's views on capital punishment, see Donnelly, A The-
ory of Justice, Judicial Methodology, and the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment, 29 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1109 (1978).
267. Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrincoiles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
I do not know what a "neutral principle" is. As will be seen, I agree with A.J. Ayer that all value
judgments are based upon feelings, and cannot be neutral. Certainly the subsidiary argument-
certain conclusions are inconsistent with predetermined premises-is "neutral," but Wechsler be-
lieved that neutrality alone could evaluate cases such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
268. W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 56-64 (1965).
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delegated the power to decide which political opponents should live
or die. Erroneous or biased treason convictions can be partially
cured only as long as the person lives.
Enmund reinforces the argument that murder is an element
necessary to justify the death penalty. The State of Florida did not
prove that Enmund intended the murders or actively participated in
the death of the elderly robbery victims. In treason cases, where
murder cannot be proven, the defendant can claim that not only did
he not intend any deaths or participate in any killings, but also that
he did not cause any deaths. Thus his personal culpability was less
than that of Enmund, much less than that of aggravated murderers.
B. Justices Marshall and Brennan's Absolute Opposition
Justices Marshall and Brennan would probably extend to trea-
son cases their opposition to the death penalty. They would reject
the argument that since murderers can now be killed, traitors should
also be executed because treason is at least as venal as murder.
Brennan based his opposition upon his philosophical belief in the
"dignity of man," the underlying premise of the eighth amendment.
Brennan's foundation is a vague natural law concept that intermin-
gles his general philosophy with the specific facts of capital punish-
ment. Critics complain that Brennan ignores the criminal's
violation of the victim's dignity. Nevertheless, the death penalty is a
unique penalty, inflicting great suffering on the waiting defendant.
Taking a pragmatic approach, Justice Marshall would empha-
size that no proof of capital punishment's alleged deterrent power
exists. If the public knew this fact, most people would oppose the
penalty, since retribution alone does not justify death. Assuming
that Marshall is correct about the lack of deterrence, one wonders
about how an "informed public" would react in a treason case.269 It
269. See Sarat and Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment:
Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 171 (1976). The authors agree with Marshall
that many members of the public are "uninformed" about the deterrent effect of the death penalty,
but the authors conclude that because there are strong retributive values that also generate support
for the death penalty, knowledge about deterrence would primarily affect those who did not be-
lieve in retribution, but who did support the death penalty for deterrent purposes. After all the
data was presented from various polls, "the percentage of subjects favoring the death penalty was
reduced to less than a majority." Id at 175. Assuming the various surveys were precise and that
one should and could extrapolate from those samples into the future, I remain troubled about
defining constitutional rights based upon the beliefs of a temporary majority. For a general dis-
cussion of the problems in relying on statistics see Handlin, How to Count a Number, in TRUTH IN
HIsToRy 194 (1979).
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is easy to believe that Marshall's "informed public" is actually him-
self. There are many articulate, informed critics, such as Herbert
Packer, Ernst Van Den Hagg, and Walter Berns, who do accept the
death penalty and who would accept it even if deterrence could not
be proven. Berns based his defense on retribition:
[A]s I see it, the argument about it [capital punishment] does not turn
on the answer to the utilitarian question of whether the death penalty is
a deterrent; ... the evidence on this is unclear and, besides, as it is
usually understood, deterrence is irrelevant. The real issue is whether
justice permits or even requires the death penalty.270
C. The Inevitability of Mistake, Caprice, and Bias
1. Charles Black's Argument Against the Death Penalty
Professor Charles Black combines legal analysis--describing
the enormous discretion permeating the criminal justice system-
with the philosophical belief in language's innate inaccuracy to ar-
gue that any legal system that uses the death penalty will not only
execute some innocent people but also will capriciously allow some
guilty to live while killing other guilty people. A diverse group par-
ticipates in the process used to decide if someone should die: police,
prosecutor, witness, judge, jury, appellate court, governor or clem-
ency board, and even defendant (as well as defendant's attorney)2 7 1
After a few years of using the death penalty, one will be unable to
distinguish between those murderers who sit on death row and those
who receive a prison sentence. In Georgia, many killers have been
sentenced to death but Wayne Williams received a life sentence, de-
spite Williams's conviction for two of the mass murders of young
black boys in Atlanta. Professor Black has concluded that the
Supreme Court's attempt to reduce such inconsistencies must fail;
the Court has only created "apparent standards" by requiring the
jury to consider all mitigating circumstances and to find at least one
statutorily defined aggravating circumstance. If the stakes were not
so high, Black would find the statutes' definitions of such circum-
stances humorously vague and circular: "I think I have partly
shown why, as ought to be obvious without all this, a jury must
either resolve all these verbal puzzles for itself, without sufficient
grounds for the resolution given, or else proceed in puzzlement to its
270. W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 8 (1979).
271. See generall, C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2d Ed. augmented, 1981).
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own standardless decision--or a bit of both. '272
Black's views have never been accepted by any members of the
Supreme Court (Marshall and Brennan apparently found such ar-
guments unnecessary), but his arguments will deserve reconsidera-
tion if the Court ever has to decide the constitutionality of a capital
treason case. There will be even more discretion and a greater pos-
sibility of error in a treason case since even the initial step of defin-
ing the crime is far more difficult than defining murder, where there
is a dead or missing body and usually some evidence of foul play.
As the historical survey in this article indicated, government officials
will be tempted to use treason prosecutions to destroy their political
opponents; the possibility of such bias, which Black deliberately
does not consider, dramatically increases the likelihood of mistake
or caprice. These three factors-mistake, caprice, and bias-affect
all aspects of treason cases-initial definitions, litigation of any sin-
gle case, and application of the crime against different people.
Despite the framers' efforts to regulate treason cases, the Con-
stitution's procedural and substantive protections are unclear. Al-
though the clause probably precludes Jacque Barzun's opinion that
bad manners during a legislative meeting are treasonous,27 3 its two
definitions of treason can easily be interpreted to cover legitimate
political dissent or minor, disruptive political acts. First, the
Supreme Court has never rejected the constructive treason which
interprets "levying war" to include political riots.274 Those who par-
ticipated in the Weathermens' "Days of Rage," a violent demonstra-
tion that took place in Chicago in 1969, may have been guilty of the
lesser crimes of assault and destruction of property, but they could
272. Id at 119.
273. "I can for example imagine a truly democratic state in which it would be deemed a
form of treason punishable by death to create a disturbance in any court of deliberative assem-
bly." Barzun, In Favor of Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 161 (H.
Bedau ed. 1964). Sir Patrick Devlin has analogized homosexuality with treason.
274. Even the meaning of "war" is debatable:
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-Chief, in suppressing an
insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming
proportions as will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is a ques-
tion to be decided by him, and this court must be governed by the decisions and acts of
the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted.
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863). Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on
the issue, several state courts and lower courts have found there was "levying of war" without any
formal declaration of war. Of course, any treason against the states could occur without a Con-
gressional declaration of war. There are no reported cases of convictions for "aiding and abetting
the enemy" when war had not been declared--that is an open question.
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have been charged with treason and possibly been convicted. Their
actions were similar to those of Whiskey Rebels. Second, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of "aiding and abetting the enemy,
giving them comfort" does not define clearly what "overt acts" are
illegal.27 5 Even if Cramer still contains vitality after Kawakita in-
yoked the image of total war, who can be sure what activities-be-
yond having lunch with an enemy-are not treasonous? Since there
is no requirement that Congress first formally declare war before the
clause is invoked, a person may be unsure of who the enemy is or
when a group has become the enemy. Were the Argentines the "en-
emy" during the recent Falkland Islands conflict either before or
after the United States allied itself with Great Britain? The law has
not clarified what part or parts of the "overt act" the two witnesses
must observe, either together or alone. Additionally, the jury has
the difficult task of inferring treasonous intent from the overt act.
Such ambiguities revive the Herndon due process concern of ade-
quate advance notice (particularly when a life is at stake): "While a
coercive mechanism is necessary, it is obviously essential to define
precisely the tendency of its operations. Knowing what things it pe-
nalizes and knowing that these are within their power to do or not to
do, citizens can draw up their plans accordingly.1 2
76
American politicians have not been immune from the tempta-
tion to initiate or manipulate treason cases improperly. Thomas Jef-
ferson's unscrupulous treatment of Bollman exemplifies how the
crime of treason tempts the best of men to engage in deceitful prac-
tices. President Filmore encouraged the indictment of abolitionist
Caster Hanway, even though Filmore thought there was little likeli-
hood of success. The Justice Department tried "Tokyo Rose" for
treason despite internal studies indicating that the case was weak.
Unpopular political or religious figures ranging from Joseph Smith,
leader of the Mormons, to Joseph Herndon, Communist organizer,
faced the possibility of the death sentence for their noncriminal ac-
tions. Once a political trial has begun, the prosecution is under
enormous pressure to win. The FBI may have known that Ethel
Rosenberg was innocent, but it used this knowledge in attempts to
275. For an early attempt to define the phrase, see Warren, What is Giving Aid and Comfort
to the Enemy?, 27 YALE L.J. 331 (1917). Warren argued that words alone can be treason. Id at
340.
276. THEORY, supra note 266, at 241.
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pressure her husband into admitting guilt so he would save her.277
Assuming an act of treason has occurred, proving the crime re-
mains difficult. Judge Jerome Frank emphasizes that all legal proof
is tainted with speculation and misapprehension, first by the witness
and then by the trier of fact who hears and observes the witness. 278
Examples abound. Historian Mary-Joe Kline claims that a coded
letter-used to help prove that Burr intended to seize part of the
United States, not to invade Mexico-was a forgery written by an
associate, Johnathan Dayton. Dr. Kline concludes: "Burr was
probably guilty of something, but no one's absolutely sure of
what." 279 As theorists ranging from Montesquieu to Benjamin
Franklin observed, perjury is extremely likely in treason cases.
Prosecutorial deals with co-conspirators also facing the death pen-
alty are inevitable. The Hughes Aircraft engineer confessed agree-
ing to engage in a scheme to catch the Polish spy who originally
recruited him; the engineer received only an eight-year prison sen-
tence. 280 Threats of execution distort the plea-bargaining process
and tempt defendants to make allegations of a broader conspiracy.
The jury deciding the case will frequently be under enormous
pressure to convict people accused of treason. The jury may legiti-
mately feel directly threatened and injured by the defendant. Trea-
son can injure all citizens, while such crimes as murder primarily
harm the victim and those who know the victim. The trial itself
may be a political circus-at the risk of his life, the defendant may
turn the trial into a forum to express his beliefs. As the Herndon
case showed, the prosecution can use despicable tactics. The public-
ity would be enormous at a capital treason case, particularly if the
trial were televised. According to a study headed by Professor
Franklin Zimring, publicity can be dangerous for defendants: "An
important minority of killings-the 'retail' cases-receive more at-
tention, more complete due process, and penalties done to an order
of a magnitude higher than the low-visibility wholesale cases." 28'
Conversely, the death sentence can also distort the jury's already
277. Stem and Radosh, The Hidden Rosenberg Case, 180 NEW REPUBLIC at 13-14, June 23,
1979. See, e.g., R. RADOSH AND J. MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE (1983).
278. FRANK, supra note 2, at 14-37.
279. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
280. Sixty Minutes, supra note 134, at 18.
281. Zimring, O'Malley, and Eigen, The Going Price of Criminal Homicide in Philadelphia, in
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 83 (H. Bedau ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT].
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taxed judgment by pressuring them to acquit a person they believe
is guilty, solely because they do not think he should die. Since there
is no dead body at which to point, the jury will tend to base its
judgment as to whether a traitor should live or die on the traitor's
personality and/or beliefs.
Even after finding the defendant guilty of treason, the jury will
have to decide if he deserves to die. Assuming they can resist all the
pressures to recommend execution because of community solidarity
or because of the publicity, the jury must apply standards similar to
those condemned by Professor Black. For example, a recently pro-
posed federal statute included a death penalty section which explic-
itly required the jury to consider mitigating factors, including
political beliefs, to determine if the act was committed "under cir-
cumstances which the offender believed to provide a moral justifica-
tion or extenuation for his conduct and which is reasonable, in fact,
by ordinary standards of morality, for his conduct." 282 All traitors
can claim that their actions would benefit the populace in the long
run. If their defense is a belief in Marxism or facism, does that ideo-
logical commitment make their defense a "moral justification"
which is "reasonable," and is that belief one that is an "ordinary
standard of morality"? Or does the "ordinary standard" test really
justify execution of anyone who does not have the views of the aver-
age citizen? The meaning of this mish-mash of words is unknown.
There are additional practical and constitutional problms in
assessing the defendant's depravity. Treason can be an inchoate
crime; the trial may occur before the extent of the harm is known.
Also, the prosecution may attempt to impute many injuries to the
activity. For example, the prosecutor may claim that an allied re-
gime was overthrown because of the treason even though that gov-
ernment would have fallen anyway. Treason frequently is a group
activity. Since Ex Parte Bollman held that all members of such a
group were principals, the jury would have to decide which mem-
bers of the group deserve to die. Enmund required that aggravated
murder not be imputed to a distant principal via the felony-murder
doctrine. Applying Enmund's analysis to treason, the death penalty
should only be applied to those traitors whose treason actually
caused a harm equal to death (assuming such a harm exists), and
282. Report of Senate Judiciary Committee, To Establish Rational Criteriafor the Imposition
ofCapital Punishment, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., in BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, Supra
note 250, at 33.
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who intended such harm and/or actually participated in the harm.
Yet, it will be far more difficult to exclude marginal members of a
treasonous plot than to exclude all members of a felonious plot who
neither planned a murder, killed anyone, nor were present at the
murder scene; all members of the treasonous plot are "present" at
the crime to some degree. To kill someone who knowingly let a
rioter stay in his home, while letting murderers live, would be bi-
zarre. The best way to avoid the injustice of killing people who are
less depraved than murderers is to kill only murderers.
Professor Otto Kirchheimer observed that clemency plays a
uniquely active role in political crimes.283 From the treason trial of
the two Quakers during the Revolution to the deaths of the
Rosenbergs, requests for pardons or reprieves inevitably followed
death sentences in political cases. No pattern emerges: the two
Quakers died, Shays lived, John Brown died, all but a few of the
Confederates lived, and the Rosenbergs died. During war, the gov-
ernment is under enormous pressure to kill opponents, if only to
satisfy the blood lust of the citizenry, many of whom are dying for
the country. Each war seems to be more threatening; the nuclear
age has increased anxieties. But after the threat has passed, certain
repressive deeds, such as the internment of the American-Japa-
nese284 or the incarceration of Milligan, appear wrong. Further-
more, given the delays in the appellate system, any political criminal
who appealed his conviction would probably not be executed
promptly after his trial, much less after his crime. Yet the later exe-
cution would be final; an executed traitor, unlike the American-Jap-
anese or Milligan, could never be released. Government officials
will also use convicted traitors as bargaining chips with opposing
political forces. Both sides can threaten to kill, imprison, or trade
traitors and/or spies whom they have caught. Who will live and
who will die could be a function of international politics, not indi-
vidual depravity.
Consequently, application of the inherently and necessarily
vague law of treason leads to "wanton and freakish" results. Who
could have predicted that Cramer was not guilty of treason while
Haupt was? This inability to determine what behavior is treasonous
and what treasonous behavior is worthy of death violates Herndon's
due process requirement that a person have adequate prior notice of
283. 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 108, at 389-418.
284. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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what actions are capital offenses. Nor is it obvious why John Brown
had to be shot for his treason but Jefferson Davis, who led the Civil
War for the South, could live. Innocent people, such as Herndon,
Smith, and Hanway, will inevitably be caught up in political, legal
conflicts. (Admittedly there might be even more treason trials if
there were no possibility of the use of the death penalty; the prose-
cutor could gain the political benefit of trying the person while not
being criticized for failing to ask for death.)
The history in other relatively civilized countries is equally dis-
mal. Frenchmen Louis Malvy and Joseph Caillaux were tried for
treason because they led a coalition opposing continuation of the
First World War during its last bloody days.28 5 Consider also the
description of the rise of the Nazi regime by Hans Frank, Hitler's
legal theorist, as "the first large revolution in history that was car-
ried out by applying the existing formal code of law at the moment
of seizing power. '28 6 The Nazis' justification for killing those con-
victed of treason was neither retributivist nor utilitarian:
Punishment is not a means of education, as our apostles of humanity
pretend. Nor is it vengeance. Punishments (and here we are speaking
of offense which sully one's honor) is the simple elimination of foreign
types .... A man who doesn't regard the essence of the people (Volk-
stum) and their honor as the highest value has lost the right of being
protected by the people. As for cases of treason against the Volk or
treason against the country, penitentiary confinement and the death
penalty are the only punishment that ought to be used; that goes with-
out saying.287 (Emphasis in original.)
Killing political criminals unleashes many undesirable side ef-
285. B. INGRAHAM, POLITICAL CRIME IN EUROPE 229 (1979). Malvy was later acquitted of
treason, but convicted of "culpable misfeasance of office." Caillaux was also convicted of a lesser
crime. When a leftist government returned to power in 1924, Caillaux's record was expunged, and
he served as Minister of Finance. Id at 229, n.2.
286. Id at 257. Kirchheimer provides many examples of how governments use political
trials primarily for propaganda purposes. For example, the Nazi leadership wavered, for reasons
unrelated to the merits of the case, in deciding to initiate a treason/murder charge against Herceil
Corynazpan for killing a German diplomat: "The trial thus offers a possibility to prove to the
whole world the decisive participation of world-Jewry in the outbreak of the present war," wrote
Goebbels to Hitler. Hitler eventually decided to drop the case, apparently because he wished to
claim that France was responsible for the war. 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 108, at 101-04.
287. B. INGRAHAM, supra note 285, at 260. Kirchheimer concludes that the nature of the
charge and the course of the trial will primarily reflect the values and needs of the government, 0.
KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 108, at 118. See generally R. GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN
MODERN AMERICA (1978), for a detailed discussion of political persecution from the suppression
of labor in the 1800's to the Viet Nam era.
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fects. Controversy pervades political trials, polarizes the community
and creates martyrs. Debates continue for years about the govern-
ment's motives, the defendant's guilt, and the propriety of the pun-
ishment. 288 Supporters of the executed traitor frequently seek
vengeance, escalating domestic violence (while proponents of the
death penalty would reply that killing the traitor eliminates the pos-
sibility that supporters would engage in terrorism to secure the trai-
tor's release).289 Assuming that the treasonous faction eventually
succeeds, leaders may be far more vengeful if many of their mem-
bers were killed when they were not in power. A positive effect of
refusing to kill traitors is that a form of solidarity and pride may be
created in the country. This country has a record, reflected through
the first amendment, of not repressing political opposition as sav-
agely as most other societies. It is a tradition that gives this country
moral and political strength, a tradition that could be easily de-
stroyed by frequent use of political executions.
2. Responses to the Charges of Mistake, Caprice and Bias
In Gregg, Justice Stewart rejected Charles Black's conclusions
about the inevitability of mistake and caprice. Stewart thought that
Georgia's system of aggravating and mitigating circumstances ade-
quately prevented the total discretion previously condemned in
Furman .290 Furthermore, the Georgia Supreme Court would pro-
vide appellate review which would clarify the standards, preventing
them from being reduced to the tautology that every murder could
be characterized as "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or in-
human." Stewart considered discretionary decisions not to adminis-
ter the death penalty as "mercy" decisions. 291 Yet mercy is, and
should be, an integral part of any criminal justice system, and
should not be ignored when evaluating the impact of society's most
severe and final sanction.292 Many discretionary decisions are not
motivated by mercy; the prosecutor might not seek the death pen-
288. The endless debates over the guilt of the Rosenbergs and of Alger Hiss are classic
examples.
289. See Thornton, Terrorism and the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
181-85 (H. Bedau ed. 1982).
290. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
291. Id at 199.
292. For a discussion of the use of the death penalty and the use of mercy in place of the
death penalty during eighteenth century England, see Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal
Law, in ALBION's FATAL TREE 17 (1975).
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alty because he hopes to increase the chances of conviction. In his
concurring opinion, Justice White also found adequate protection in
appellate review. White conceded that mistakes would occur, but he
claimed, without proof, that the system was fundamentally fair.2
93
Black's response is simple. He agrees that the legal system nor-
mally tolerates error and inconsistency as inevitable products of a
system of language, interpretation, and uncertain proof. Yet in
these cases lives are at stake.294 Black then dissects the various stat-
utes' definitions of aggravating circumstances to show that these at-
tempts to reduce discretion are illusory. State statutes authorizing
the death penalty for treason against the state are even more poorly
drafted than the murder statutes Black condemned. Violating
Gregg, Woodson, Lockett and the rest of the cases, Georgia's statute
does not even require consideration of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances: "(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the of-
fenses of aircraft hijacking or treason, in any case." 295 The Missis-
sippi law asks the jury to apply the same standards it would use in a
murder case, such as (5)(g), "[t]he capital offense was committed to
disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function
or the enforcement of laws"; and (5)(h), "[t]he capital offense was
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. ' 296 To paraphase Justice
Holmes, the sections only have to be stated to be rebutted.
D. 9hy Traitors Should Die: Appying Burger's Coker Dissent
To Treason
Chief Justice Burger's criticism of the Coker decision can be
reduced to four intertwined arguments: (1) the plurality misapplied
the subjective test; (2) the plurality misinterpreted the objective
data; (3) the plurality did not give adequate weight to the beneficial
effects of the death penalty; and (4) the plurality inappropriately im-
posed their own views upon the legislatures. Surprisingly, Burger
did not discuss retributive justifications for the death penalty.
293. 428 U.S. at 226.
294. "But death is unique, and the procedures we must use, having no better, in our entire
system of justice-and that is really the kindest thing one can say of that system-may still not be
good enough for the death choice." C. BLACK, supra note 271, at 128.
295. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(a) (1982).
296. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (1977).
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L The Subjective Test
The argument that the death penalty could not be used in trea-
son cases whenever murder had not been proved confirms Burger's
belief that the Coker plurality's original conception of proportional-
ity was wrong. Even though the Chief Justice had agreed with the
plurality that rape was the most heinous crime aside from murder,
he could easily use his dissent to justify the killing of traitors. The
same underlying principle supported the execution of both killers
and rapists: to protect society from those who have "shown total
and repeated disregard for the welfare, safety, personal integrity and
human worth of others, and who seemingly cannot be deterred from
continuing such conduct. '297 (Emphasis added.) In Gregg, the
Court held that the death penalty could be used against those who
had committed "crimes," implying that acts other than murder were
covered. Certain acts of treason, such as selling military secrets to
the Soviet Union, or initiating civil insurrection, arguably could
cause more injury to more people than a single murder, even though
no life had yet been taken and there would be uncertainty if any
lives would ever be taken. By constitutionalizing the principle of
the lex talionis, the plurality created a standard which limits soci-
ety's ability to defend itself and adapt to changing political circum-
stances. The decision to kill traitors should be based upon
numerous factors, such as the motives of the traitor, the harm
caused, potential harm and the number of acts committed, and be
resolved by the trier of fact (with appellate review to prevent abuse).
The defense could attempt to narrow Burger's analysis by argu-
ing that an act of treason does not show disregard for any individ-
ual; the crime is an inchoate injury against a mythical entity, the
"state." But Burger might respond that enforcing treason laws does
not only protect the "state," or the existing regime. Such enforce-
ment also helps prevent military defeats and violent revolutions,
both of which inflict great suffering upon ordinary citizens. Conse-
quently, Burger would probably categorize treason as a "major"
crime, "a criminal activity which consistently poses serious danger
of death or grave bodily harm . ., -298 punishable by death.
Burger's tests require as many, if not more, subjective assump-
tions as the plurality's approach: (a) that certain penalties are un-
297. 433 U.S. at 610 (Burger, J., dissenting).
298. Id at 620.
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constitutionally disproportionate; (b) that the state cannot kill for
"minor" crimes; (c) that there may be a difference between recidi-
vists (the undeterrable) and first-time offenders; and (d) that judicial
deference to death penalty legislation should be triggered exactly at
the point of life-endangering activities (wherever that point is).
Under a principle debatably less "neutral" than "a life for a life," he
has left enormous power to the government under his tests.
2 The Objective Test
The Chief Justice would probably not be swayed by objective
proof indicating that few states allow the execution of traitors. He
would not care that there have been no jury-determined death
sentences or executions for any political crimes since the Rosenbergs
and that no political prisoners-aside from those making the chal-
lenge at the time of the case-would be on death row. He might
reply that the lack of cases and the lack of defendants are proof of
the death penalty's deterrence. Furthermore, he would claim it is
unwise to determine the evolving standards of decency contained in
the eighth amendment by freezing the analysis at any given time;
the federal government and the states are constantly experimenting
with new sanctions, as well as responding to the numerous Supreme
Court opinions on the death penalty. Unless the objective data
showed virtually universal rejection of the penalty for treason, the
Court should defer to the legislature. Declaring a punishment un-
constitutional precludes continued consideration of that penalty,
which in this instance might be disastrous since treason might flour-
ish in a deteriorating political climate.
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice and his fellow dissenters would
have to refute the argument that the American society has long sur-
vived without killing many people for any political crimes. Cer-
tainly there have been many opportunities. The state has more
power than ever over citizens because of nuclear weapons, com-
puters, media manipulation, and increased loyalty. To accept the
death penalty for treason could well undermine our fragile political
values, which tolerate political dissent while resisting violent
opposition.
VI. Is THERE A STATUTORY COMPROMISE?
The Justices have created two competing remedies in response
to constitutional challenges to the death penalty. Either the Court
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has agreed with defendant and voided the statute, or else the Court
has required that the trial court use more intensely the system of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Although I believe that
any capital treason statute should be voided, such a decision would
be unsettling; we can all think of acts of treason which cause deaths
(although proof of murder would be difficult), or acts of treason
which cause far more suffering, costs, and increased insecurity than
most murders.299 But just using the circumstances test insufficiently
reduces the likelihood that people would be improperly tried for
treason and/or sentenced to death for treason. The Court could in-
stead invoke the vagueness doctrines, inferred from the first amend-
ment and the due process clauses, and successfully used in cases
such as Herndon, to require that the legislature limit and define trea-
son as much as possible before authorizing capital punishment.
Vagueness arguments are often rejected because the Court con-
cludes that the language is as precise as possible. The following pro-
posed statute indicates that such is not the case in capital treason
cases.
A. The Proposed Statute
Treason may be punishable by death only if the defendant has been
convicted of "aggravated treason" under at least one of the following
two definitions:
I. The defendant, who is a citizen of the United States, was guilty
of "aggravated levying of war." The judge or jury must make all
of the following findings of fact prior to convicting the defendant:
A. The defendant engaged in armed combat or directed
others to engage in armed combat within the immediate
future;
299. Even if the Court were to agree that executing nonmurdering traitors was unconstitu-
tional, the government's power--to execute for murder those traitors who caused a death with
sufficient malice aforethought--creates an enormous loophole that can be abused easily. The one
accusation more damaging than calling someone a traitor is to label someone a murderous traitor.
An angry jury might agree with the prosecution that virtually any act could have caused the
deaths of American soldiers during wartime, and that any dissent was treason. Many people
could be rounded up in one murder-treason trial under Bollman's holding that all are principals
who act in a case that is treason. Thus, in a volatile political climate, many people could be
threatened with unfair murder charges. For a discussion of the use of murder charges as a polit-
ical weapon, see 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 108, at 53-62.
On the other hand, the constitutionality of executing murderers reduces the risks of not kill-
ing traitors. Potential traitors will know that many of their deeds may be construed as murder and
thus will be deterred. Many of the worst acts of treason-blowing up a factory or releasing the
location of troop ships-lead to murder. The most effective forms of treason usually result in the
deaths of many soldiers and/or citizens.
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B. The defendant did not act alone;
C. The defendant either directed or participated in armed,
life-endangering acts of violence; and
D. The judge or jury must find that the defendant in-
tended that such acts occur, and that the defendant in-
tended that said violent act or acts would lead to the
immediate overthrow of the government.
Furthermore, said act or acts must unequivocally manifest
treacherous intent to levy war.
II. The defendant, who is a citizen of the United States, was guilty
of "aggravated adherence to the enemy." The judge or jury must
find the facts under subsections A, B, and D, as well as under at
least one part of subsection C. prior to convicting the defendant:
A. The Congress had formally declared war against a
country or countries [hereinafter referred to as the
"enemy"];
B. The defendant's act or acts set forth in subsection C oc-
curred after said declaration of war, and
C. The act or acts consisted of one or more of the
following:
1. The defendant gave life-endangering military secrets
to the enemy;
2. The defendant participated with the enemy in armed
attacks on this country by engaging in armed combat,
knowing that his participation might immediately lead
to deaths of American citizens.
D. The judge or jury must find that such act or acts were
intentionally made by the defendant, and that such act or
acts unequivocally manifested treacherous intent to adhere
to the enemy.
III. After finding the defendant guilty under Part I and/or Part II
of this Act, the judge or jury shall not authorize the death penalty
unless they find in a subsequent proceeding that the aggravating
circumstances of the case outweigh any mitigating factors, which
include, but are not limited to:
A. insanity;
B. age;
C. moral or political belief in the propriety of said acts;
and/or
D. degree of injury actually inflicted upon the country.
The trier of fact will have found sufficient aggravating circum-
stances by having found the defendant guilty of aggravated trea-
son under Part I and/or Part II. The prosecution is allowed to
include, as an additional aggravating circumstance, proof of actual
injury caused by the acts if the prosecution can prove beyond a
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reasonable doubt that the injuries were proximately caused by the
defendant's aggravated treason.
IV. The death penalty cannot be used against any citizen for any
crimes aside from treason or murder, unless said citizen is a mem-
ber of the Armed Forces during a time of armed conffict. This
statute does not preclude the government from trying the defend-
ant for murder even if the defendant may have engaged in activi-
ties which may have constituted treason and/or aggravated
treason.
V. The defendant is to receive the following procedural protec-
tions in addition to those granted all criminal defendants:
A. Two witnesses simultaneously observed the act or acts set
forth in Part I A through D and/or under Part II B, C and D.
B. The defendant has a waivable right to a jury to determine
if he is guilty of "aggravated treason." The defendant also
has a waivable right to a jury to decide if death should be
imposed. If the jury recommends mercy, that opinion shall
be accepted by the trial judge. The trial judge has the discre-
tion to set aside a jury recommendation that the defendant
die.
B. A Section-by-Section Analysis of the Proposed Statute
The introductory section stating that treason may be punish-
able by death incorporates the holding of Jurek and Woodson that
the death penalty cannot be mandatory for any crime. The Court
would probably reject the government's argument that treason is so
different from murder that all traitors deserve to die. Individualized
determinations are even more necessary in treason cases since the
crime covers so many activities.
The definition of "aggravated levying of war" limits the death
penalty to armed insurrections by groups intending to overthrow the
government. Thus, draft riots and other forms of resistance against
one policy of the government (segregation, the fugitive slave law,
desegregation, a war, etc.) would be excluded. Requiring proof of
carrying arms and of the actuality of violence limits the death pen-
alty to the most extreme forms of resistance. Requiring that this
form of treason be a collective act also reduces the likelihood that
the government can use the death penalty to destroy selected indi-
vidual opponents. Under this definition, Caster Hanway could not
have been .killed since he neither carried arms nor intended to over-
throw the government. The Confederates would have been guilty of
aggravated treason. Aaron Burr might have been guilty since he
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allegedly directed an insurrection that would have used arms to
seize part of the country.
The limitation of "aggravated adherence to the enemy" to acts
occurring after a formal declaration of war eliminates both unfair
executions caused by improper notice and ex post facto treason.
The defendant could not argue that he did not know who the enemy
was, given the formal declaration of war, or that he was acting le-
gally at the time of the crime. Since the overt act of "aiding and
abetting" may include anything worse than lunches with the enemy
(Cramer), the proposed definition only allows the death penalty for
the worst overt acts where the treason is likely to cause death (but
proof of murder under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
might be impossible)-the release of life-endangering military
secrets and/or participating with the enemy in its armed attacks.
The procedural protections contained within the Constitution
are enhanced by incorporating Learned Hand's theory in United
States v. Robinson that the overt act must, by itself, unequivocally
manifest treasonous intent.3oo Thus, Cramer and Haupt could not
be killed since neither of their acts unequivocally manifested trea-
sonous intent. -Kawakita could have been in more peril since he
beat American prisoners of war, which might be considered partici-
pation with the enemy, yet he was not armed and did not intend the
deaths of any American citizens. Since they did not carry weapons,
convicted traitors such as Tokyo Rose or Ezra Pound would not die.
The two witness requirement is tightened to reduce the likelihood of
mistake or perjury.
The traitor must also have intended that the aggravated trea-
sonous acts actually occur. This section incorporates the standard of
depraved intent presented in Enmund. Someone may have joined a
radical group to protest a war and agreed to join a potentially vio-
lent demonstration (even to carry a club), without wanting to over-
throw the government. That person should not be executed even if
the government can show that some of his colleagues were guilty of
aggravated treason.
Otto Kirchheimer has noted that repressive governments want
to remove political crimes from juries; judges will often be more
300. See also The King v. Barker. "For this purpose the only evidence of criminal intent is
to be found in the nature and circumstances of the act itself." The King v. Barker, [1924]
N.Z.L.R. 865, 876.
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sympathetic to the regime.301 Establishing the right to have a jury
both determine guilt and the death sentence limits the possibility of
institutional abuse by "hanging judges." Even after conviction, the
jury must make an additional determination before sentencing the
person to death that the statutorily defined aggravating circum-
stances contained in the treason definitions outweigh any and all
mitigating factors.
The degree of injury actually inflicted will be a factor in decid-
ing if a person should die, both as an aggravating and mitigating
circumstance. This factor can be difficult to determine and can be
used by the prosecution to make the defendant appear responsible
for any number of problems. Requiring the strictest level of causa-
tion will help reduce abuse.
The final section incorporates Professor Hurst's position that
the treason clause's protections are weakened when they can be
skirted by charging the defendant with some other political crime.
Since aggravated treason is the most venal political crime, and since
the underlying death penalty is the most severe sanction, limiting
the penalty to that crime both precludes evasion of the treason
clause's procedural and substantive requirements while supporting
the proposed statute's goal to limit the death penalty to crimes as
depraved as aggravated murder.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has considered the constitutionality of using the
state's ultimate sanction (the death penalty) against what arguably is
the ultimate crime against the state (treason) by studying the three
interrelated fields of history, moral philosophy, and legal doctrine.
Advocates for both sides can find numerous supporting facts and
arguments. The history of treason reveals treason's real threat to
state sovereignty as well as political leaders' willingness to use polit-
ical crimes to stifle their legitimate opponents; political justice can
be a unique form of legal injustice. The philosophical debate be-
tween the utilitarians and the retributivists both complicates and
simplifies the analysis by revealing how many premises enter into
any effort to create a hierarchy of crime. Even if the philosophical
argument were not stalemated, no theorist can precisely explain how
one should rank crimes and assess individual culpability. Nor does
301. See 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 108, 1553-62.
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legal precedent provide a clear answer; the Coker proportionality
argument may not prevail over the earlier decision to execute the
Rosenbergs and the long-standing treason laws authorizing death.
The inability to resolve this problem conclusively might be an
example of Martin Buber's claim that words "falsify." No matter
how elaborate or erudite the analysis becomes, the issue may pri-
marily be decided by the adjudicators' own emotional reaction to
two legitimate, competing fears. Most of us dread the midnight
knock on the door; we do not want to confront our own police,
much less an invading army or armed rebels. Nobody can know
which fear is more likely to be realized: the use of executions to
destroy political opposition or the defeat of the country because it
could not kill its enemies.
My personal opposition to the death penalty is based upon
more than a greater distrust of our government. Although I also
fear foreign powers and violent revolutionaries (as well as murder-
ers), I believe this obviously brutal penalty requires us unnecessarily
and dangerously to take the place of the "official executioner," Inev-
itable Death. An ancient poem by Lao Tzu summarizes my under-
lying reaction:
If men are not afraid to die,
It is of no avail to threaten them with death.
If men live in constant fear of dying,
And if breaking the law means that a man
will be killed,
Who will dare to break the law?
There is always an official executioner.
If you try to take his place,
It is like trying to be a master
carpenter and cutting wood.
If you try to cut wood like a master
carpenter, you will only hurt your hand.
30 2
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